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U.S. immigration and refugee policy reform has stalled due to competing national 
narratives. Claims that refugees harm the U.S. economy and national security are in direct 
conflict with the country’s historical national identity and values, and this is apparent in 
the public discourse. This thesis explores the validity of these claims and provides a 
comparative analysis with Canada and Germany, both of which are democratic Western 
societies facing similar issues. It answers the question of what U.S. policy makers can 
learn from the refugee policies of Canada and Germany and makes 11 recommendations 
for the United States based on this analysis. This thesis finds the claims that refugees 
negatively impact a country’s economy and national security in the United States, 
Canada, and Germany to be unfounded. Basing U.S. refugee policy on unfounded claims 
harms U.S. standing and credibility in the international community as well as deprives it 
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Since the 20th century, America has seized opportunities to lead the international 
community and subsequently claim global power status and influence. It proved its 
military might in both world wars, and, for decades, it has championed human rights 
around the world. Although humanitarian policies often serve the country’s self-interests 
politically, humanitarian actions also fulfill America’s promise of a land of opportunity, 
rooted in its historical identity as an immigrant nation.1 Currently, the United States faces 
several difficulties in the immigration sphere, especially when it comes to reforming its 
refugee policy to meet the demands of the current world.  
The process for refugee resettlement in the United States is not necessarily 
broken, yet U.S. policy makers are unable to decide whom they wish to allow to go 
through that process and when. These selections are driven by political objectives and 
short-term thinking rather than by long-term strategy and careful employment of research 
and sound evidence. This thesis identifies the lack of clear and collective national 
strategic immigration plans or priorities as significant problems. In the absence of a 
national strategy and priorities, U.S. refugee policy lacks consistency, is subject to 
political discourse, and is often perpetuated without evidence. The failure of the United 
States to lead the response to the forced migration of Syrian war refugees challenges both 
its position as the global leader in humanitarian policies as well as aspects of its own 
national identity. Justification for this failure is found in the recent national discourse that 
has framed refugees, and immigration in general, as homeland security threats as well as 
a drain on the country’s economy.  
However, this thesis finds extensive research that shows refugees who resettle in 
the United States harm neither the local nor the national economies. Some evidence even 
suggests refugees may improve local and national economies. Refugees do face hurdles 
to economic integration upon initial arrival, which has some costs, but in the long-term, 
they perform on par with other immigrants and native-born people and contribute to the 
                                                 
1 Eleanor Acer, The Syrian Refugee Crisis and the Need for U.S. Leadership (New York: Human 
Rights First, 2016), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/HRFSyrianRefCrisis.pdf.  
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economy. Although costs are certainly inherent in the resettlement of refugees, if the 
United States invests in social and economic integration, evidence suggests refugees have 
a net neutral or positive effect on the economy as do other immigrants. 
Meanwhile, reports regarding the effects of refugees on United States national 
security are sparse. Despite the prevalence of claims about the homeland security threat 
posed by refugees, an extremely small number of terrorist plotters and serious criminals 
have entered the United States as refugees. Although the narratives about refugees and 
their threat to the prosperity and security of the United States have been confusing and 
contradictory, the evidence relating to the validity of these threats is clear. The United 
States’ strength and status in the world comes from its military, wealth, and adherence to 
and promotion of moral ideals.2 Ignoring the evidence when debating refugee policy is, 
therefore, not only counterproductive but also potentially dangerous to United States’ 
maintenance of its status in the world.  
This thesis provides a comparative analysis of the refugee policies in United 
States, Canada, and Germany, all liberal democracies facing similar immigration issues. 
It finds that claims that refugees negatively impact a country’s economy and national 
security in Canada and Germany are also unfounded. Fears of economic and security 
collapses resulting from the massive influx of Syrian refugees to Germany, for example, 
have proven to be without merit. This analysis answers the question of what U.S. policy 
makers can learn from the refugee policies of Canada and Germany and makes 
11 recommendations for the United States based on this analysis.  
Although the negative claims about refugees are baseless, there remain significant 
challenges and outcomes that must be addressed in the country’s refugee policy. First, 
policy makers must recognize and accept the narrative that refugees harm the U.S. 
economy and national security is baseless and promote these facts to the larger society. 
Other challenges of fiscal prudency and homeland security appear to have a common 
solution––effective integration. The successful integration of refugees into a host 
country’s labor market and greater society accelerates those positive effects of their 
                                                 
2 Bryce E. Yost, “Admitting Syrian Refugees: Is the Threat of Islamic State Infiltration Justified?” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2017), http://hdl.handle.net/10945/55562, 34.  
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migration as well as minimizes the risk and vulnerability of ostracized refugees falling 
prey to crime and extremist ideology.  
These findings matter for several reasons. America and its allies generally accept 
that “the United States leads the world in three distinct areas: military strength, wealth, 
and adherence to and promotion of moral ideals.”3 Its strength and wealth have been 
demonstrated through its military strikes in Syria and giving $4.5 billion in humanitarian 
aid to the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) since the start of 
the Syrian crisis. 4 However, in its response to the Syrian crisis, the United States has 
failed to adhere to its role as a promoter of moral ideals.5 American identity based on an 
immigrant heritage, the promise of a land of opportunity, and refuge for those fleeing 
dangerous and oppressive situations in their home countries are such ideas. Increasing the 
securitization of immigrants since the 9/11 terrorist attacks has made it difficult for the 
United States to adhere to its moral ideals. The relatively moderate action of the United 
States in accepting Syrian refugees under the Obama administration and its outward 
hostility and skepticism of refugees under the Trump administration thus far has 
threatened the United States’ position in the international community by undermining its 
moral authority and leadership.   
The U.S. reaction to the Syrian refugee crisis is comparatively weak when 
compared to the responses of Canada and Germany. Although the United States and 
Canada share a tradition of immigration, the two countries have responded differently to 
the Syrian refugee crisis.6 Canada’s strongly positive position toward refugees is a large 
reason for the increase in Canada’s stature in the international community over recent 
years.7 Though not without criticism, Germany has also strengthened its status on the 
                                                 
3 Ibid., 20–22.  
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Melissa Carlier, “Explaining Differences in the Canadian and American Response to the Syrian 
Refugee Crisis,” Virginia Policy Review 9, no. 2 (2016): 56–82.  
7 Jonathan Kay, “Why Canada’s Refugee Policy May Actually Be Doing More Harm than Good,” 
National Post, September 8, 2017, http://nationalpost.com/news/canada/jonathan-kay-why-canadas-
refugee-policy-may-actually-be-doing-more-harm-than-good. 
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European continent, and indeed throughout the world, by taking in the largest number of 
refugees in Europe. Meanwhile, the United States has abandoned its adherence to its 
moral ideals, and in doing so, may be jeopardizing its wealth, security, and power. Soft 
power is particularly important in international relations, and many lawmakers and 
citizens fear recent restrictive U.S. refugee policy will erode this important power.8 
Therefore, widespread evidence and best practices in Canada and Germany both offer the 
United States the information and tools to regain this power, should policy makers have 




                                                 
8 Nahal Toosi, “Lawmakers Fear Trump Will Undercut America’s ‘Soft Power,’” Politico, November 
13, 2016, https://www.politico.com/story/2016/11/trump-america-soft-power-231253; Meghan L. 




A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Since the 20th century, America has seized opportunities to lead internationally 
and subsequently claim global power status and influence. The United States secured its 
place as a global superpower following World War II, and its status was later reinforced 
with the end of the Cold War with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In addition to 
commanding military might, the United States became a global advocate for human 
rights, leading the resettlement efforts of hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese refugees 
in the late 1970s and 1980s, for example. Although humanitarian policies often serve the 
country’s self-interests politically, actions like this also fulfill America’s promise of a 
land of opportunity, rooted in its historical identity as an immigrant nation.1 Currently, 
however, the United States faces several difficulties in the immigration sphere, especially 
when it comes to its refugee policy. These challenges go to the heart of its identity as a 
global power and a nation of immigrants. 
Recent national discourse has framed refugees, and immigration in general, as a 
serious homeland security threat, especially concerning the vulnerabilities associated with 
entry by foreign terrorist actors. The House Homeland Security Committee’s Terror 
Threat Snapshot from September 2016 cites several cases of terrorist attacks in Europe 
committed by individuals believed to have posed as Syrian refugees and points to 
concerns of the ability of the United States to properly vet and screen potential refugees.2 
Still, history shows immigrants are an integral part of the country. Their 
contributions to the U.S. culture and economy cannot be understated. The American 
struggle of staying true to its identity and economic drivers while addressing the threats 
presented by a deeply interconnected, globalized, and politically fragile world presents a 
                                                 
1 Eleanor Acer, The Syrian Refugee Crisis and the Need for U.S. Leadership (New York: Human 
Rights First, 2016), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/HRFSyrianRefCrisis.pdf.  




challenge, compounded by the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and resulting heightened national 
security concerns. The post-9/11 wars in the Middle East have further increased the 
national insecurities surrounding the admission of immigrants as witnessed by the 
attempted ban of select nationalities by the Trump administration. 
Syrian war refugees present a significant challenge to the U.S. refugee policy. To 
date, approximately 11 million refugees have fled Syria since their civil war began in 
2011. Although that accounts for just 0.1 percent of the current world population, this 
massive forced migration has created serious response challenges for the international 
community. Additionally, it has facilitated the radicalization of the politics and policies in 
nations surrounding Syria, such as Turkey and Lebanon, and throughout the European 
Union (EU).3 Such a mass migration and displacement strains the resources of those host 
countries not equipped to handle such a large and sustained influx of migrants. As a new 
wave of nationalism spreads throughout the world, as seen in Brexit, the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election, and in France, for example, scholars seek to understand the causes 
of these worldwide shifts. Whatever their cause, whether it be because of economic 
inequalities or the fear of terrorism, anti-immigrant sentiments appear pervasive in the 
current U.S. national discourse. For example, a poll by the Chicago Council on Global 
Affairs found that only 36 percent of U.S. voters supported admitting Syrian refugees 
into the country.4 Meanwhile, an August 2016 poll by Pew Research Center found that 66 
percent of registered voters who supported Trump cited immigration as a “very big” 
problem in the United States.5 
                                                 
3 Jamie Oppenheim, “SF State Experts Weigh in on Rise of Far-right Populism in Europe,” SF State 
News, May 5, 2017, http://news.sfsu.edu/news-story/sf-state-experts-weigh-rise-far-right-populism-europe; 
Michael J. Koplow, “After Erdogan’s Referendum Victory,” Foreign Affairs, April 17, 2017, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2017-04-16/after-erdogans-referendum-victory. 
4 “Poll: Most Americans Oppose Admitting Syrian Refugees, Favor Limited Military Involvement to 
Combat ISIS in Syria,” Chicago Council on Global Affairs, August 15, 2016, 
https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/press-release/poll-most-americans-oppose-admitting-syrian-refugees-
favor-limited-military.  
5 Carroll Doherty, “5 Facts about Trump Supporters’ Views of Immigration,” Pew Research Center. 
August 25, 2016, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/08/25/5-facts-about-trump-supporters-views-
of-immigration/.  
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The failure of the United States to lead the response to the forced migration of 
Syrian war refugees challenges both its position as the global leader in humanitarian 
policies as well as aspects of its own national identity. A 2016 Oxfam international report 
found the United States contributed only seven percent of its “fair share” of refugee 
resettlement admission pledges, and 76 percent of its “fair share” of funding as compared 
to other wealthy, developed nations.6 The report lists Canada, Germany, and Norway as 
contributing well over 100 percent of their fair share in both areas.7 The domestic 
populist movement’s success in the 2016 American presidential election suggests an 
increase in aid and support in this crisis is unlikely, and a reduction may be possible.  
This thesis provides an understanding of the current U.S. response to refugees in 
the context of its current legal and political immigration framework. Refugee law remains 
largely unchanged since the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980. The last significant 
general immigration legislation was the Immigration Act of 1965, which eliminated 
country quotas and created admission classes. Since then, especially over the last two 
decades, many state and local governments have created their own immigration policies, 
some of which directly conflict with federal policy, to address particular needs that have 
arisen in the world. Sanctuary city policies are one such example of the national 
fragmentation and contradiction in policies and approaches to immigration. These 
contradictions, along with various current homeland security challenges, a historically 
established economy that relies on cheap labor, and the United States’ position as a 
global leader, stress a system that already lacks a clear strategy. Reassessment and reform 
of the current immigration policy is required to ensure the United States retains its 
position of status, wealth, and democratic principles in an ever-changing global and 
domestic environment. Such reform is broadly supported among policy makers and the 
                                                 
6 Alexandra Saieh et al., Syria Crisis Fair Share Analysis 2016 (Oxford: Oxfam, 2016), 
https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/bn-syria-fair-shares-analysis-010216-
en.pdf.  
7 Ibid.  
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public alike.8 In fact, reform was a top priority for the past two administrations, but 
despite attempts throughout those 16 years, neither was able to achieve comprehensive 
immigration reform. Questions of security and economy presented challenges they could 
not be overcome, internally determining fixed immigration values, priorities, and updates.  
However, the United States is not alone in confronting the question of settling 
refugees and new immigrants. Countries such as Germany and Canada face a similar 
situation. A comparative analysis of such countries in this thesis assists in imagining and 
determining possible refugee policy choices and approaches and may assist U.S. policy 
makers. Canada shares the continent and an immigration settlement history with the 
United States, and it has welcomed thousands of refugees since the Syrian conflict. 
Germany serves as a case study of a democratic European country forced to respond to 
refugee crises, particularly those refugees from the Syrian conflict. By examining refugee 
immigration policy in these countries, this thesis provides a unique analysis of a topic 
that is widely researched and remains an urgent issue. This work offers an understanding 
of how some countries in similar circumstances to that of the United States are addressing 
a clash between those who welcome refugees and those who are concerned about security 
and the loss of jobs to newcomers. It highlights potential policy options as well as 
formulates conclusions and guidance for application to the unique American experience 
and associated homeland security challenges. Policy makers should understand the 
relationships among refugees and crime, terrorism, the economy, international relations, 
and global power when considering a strategic plan for U.S. refugee policy. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 What can U.S. policy makers learn from the successes and failures of the 
refugee policies of Canada and Germany?  
 Based on this analysis, what policy options could potentially succeed in 
the United States?  
                                                 
8 Randal C. Archibold and Megan Thee-Brenan, “Poll Shows Most in U.S. Want Overhaul of 
Immigration Laws,” New York Times, May 3, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/04/us/04poll.html; 
Alexander Burns, “Polls: Immigration Reform Popular,” Politico, June 13, 2013, 
https://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/poll-huge-support-for-immigration-reform-092701. 
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 What should a strategic plan for a U.S. refugee policy be comprised of, 
considering international relations and foreign policy, crime and terrorism, 
and economic needs?  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This thesis examines U.S. refugee policy and the needed reform through a 
comparative analysis of Canada and Germany, an understanding of the current U.S. 
immigration environment, and its history. Policy makers should understand the 
relationships among refugees and domestic issues, such as the economy, and international 
relations when considering a strategic plan for U.S. refugee policy. This literature review 
summarizes existing research findings in the areas of immigration and the economy, 
historical immigration and refugee policy, and the relationship between the United States 
and global human rights. 
1. Immigration and the Economy 
Scholars and think tanks have performed extensive research on the effect of 
immigration on various portions of the economy, often analyzing these effects through 
the study of wages and the costs of foreign workers, immigrants in general, to 
government. Various studies on immigration fail to support the assertion that immigration 
creates drastic sweeping costs or gains. For instance, Rowthorn conducted a complete and 
high-level analysis of the effect of immigration on the economy.9 He finds no strong 
fiscal case either for or against continuous large-scale immigration.10 Bodvarsson and 
Van den Berg also find that although economists tend to view immigration favorably, 
neither theoretical models nor their supporting evidence provide information sufficient 
for sound policy.11 Additionally, Duleep notes, “despite extensive empirical research, 
there is still no decisive answer as to whether poorly educated immigrants hurt, help, or 
                                                 
9 Robert Rowthorn, “The Fiscal Impact of Immigration on the Advanced Economies,” Oxford Review 
of Economic Policy 24, no. 3 (2008): 561–581.  
10 Ibid.  
11 Orn B. Bodvarsson and Hendrik Van den Berg, The Economics of Immigration: Theory and Policy 
(New York: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2009), 415–428.  
 6
have no significant effect on the employment and wages of poorly educated natives.”12 
This ambiguity is largely due to the challenges inherent to this research topic. Immigrant 
workers of varying skills and national origins are not evenly distributed across the 
country. For example, local and regional economies can differ dramatically and present 
challenges in national decision making, such as achieving consensus on immigration 
policy. The national fiscal effects of immigration are difficult to characterize, but it is 
easier to do so for local economies.13  
A 1991 study by Altonji and Card finds little evidence indicating a correlation 
between immigrants and the employment status of similarly low-skilled, native-born 
workers, it but does conclude an increase of immigrants within a population reduces the 
weekly earnings of low-skilled, native workers.14 An earlier solo study by Card finds that 
in Miami during the early 1980s, there was virtually no effect of mass Cuban 
immigration on that local economy. Miami’s labor market was able to absorb and adjust 
to the influx, possibly due to its experience with past immigration waves.15 More 
recently, Harvard immigration economist George Borjas calculates that legal and illegal 
immigration reduces wages of native-born workers by $402 billion per year.16 Borjas 
further finds that this loss is offset by the $437 billion per year increase in wages and/or 
profits for those who use immigrant labor.  
Another study suggests illegal immigration has a positive impact on the U.S. 
economy, but when considering all fiscal impacts, illegal immigrants present a net fiscal 
                                                 
12 Harriet Orcutt Duleep, “US Immigration Policy at a Crossroads” (discussion paper no. 7136, 
Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit, Bonn, 2013).  
13 Ethan Lewis and Giovanni Peri, “Immigration and the Economy of Cities and Regions” (working 
paper, National Bureau of Economic Research, Washington, DC, 2014), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w20428.  
14 Joseph Altonji and David Card, “The Effects of Immigration on the Labor Market Outcomes of 
Less-skilled Natives,” in Immigration, Trade and the Labor Market, ed. John M. Abowd and Richard B. 
Freeman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 201–234.  
15 David Card, “The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market,” Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review 43, no. 2 (1990): 245–257.  
16 George Borjas, Immigration and the American Worker (Washington, DC: Center for Immigration 
Studies, 2013), https://cis.org/Report/Immigration-and-American-Worker.  
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cost, although this cost is unknown.17 Conversely, Orrenius and Zavodny find the 
economy benefits overall from immigration although there are both winners and losers.18 
Lewis and Perri found that across a wide range of settings, research approaches, and 
geographic areas, immigration correlates with greater economic productivity and higher 
wages for native-born workers.19 
Moreover, there is evidence that immigrants may be a net fiscal cost to society, 
yet other evidence suggests they may be a net fiscal gain. The variation could perhaps be 
explained by the findings of Blau and Mackie from the National Academies of the 
Sciences. They find immigrants have very little effect on wages and employment of 
native-born workers with any negative effects likely felt by existing immigrants or 
native-born workers without high school diplomas.20 Furthermore, their research finds 
first-generation immigrants cost the government more than native-born people, and the 
U.S. children of those immigrants are strong economic contributors who help create an 
overall positive impact on the economy.21 This finding is somewhat contrary to a 1995 
report by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, which found 
migrants worldwide contribute more in taxes and socially than they receive in benefits as 
well as boost the working-age population.22 Dealing with population demographic 
changes is very important in economies such as Japan, and soon in the United States, as 
their working-age populations shrink in relation to the older non-working population. The 
trouble with this global generalization is that it considers neither the host country’s 
                                                 
17 Ramanujan Nadadur, “Illegal Immigration: A Positive Economic Contribution to the United States,” 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 35, no. 6 (2009): 1037–1052.  
18 Pia M. Orrenius and Madeline Zavodny, “The Economics of U.S. Immigration Policy,” Journal of 
Policy Analysis and Management 31, no. 4 (2012): 948–596.  
19 Lewis and Peri, “Immigration and the Economy of Cities and Regions.”  
20 Francine Blau and Christopher Mackie, The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration 
(Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2016), https://www.nap.edu/catalog/23550/the-economic-
and-fiscal-consequences-of-immigration.  
21 Ibid. 
22 Kathleen Newland, “The Impact of U.S. Refugee Policies on U.S. Foreign Policy: A Case of the 
Tail Wagging the Dog?” in Threatened Peoples, Threatened Borders: World Migration and U.S. Policy, 
ed. Teitelbaum, Michael S. and Myron Weiner (New York: The American Assembly, 1995).  
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economic landscape nor its particular migrant populations and associated skills, which 
can be very contextual. 
Empirical research examining the economic impact of refugee immigrants on the 
U.S. economy is sparse.23 Kalena Cortes’s work finds refugee immigrants in the United 
States, “have lower annual earnings upon arrival; however, their annual earnings grow 
faster over time than those of economic immigrants.”24 Similarly, a Migration Policy 
Institute report found that from 2009 through 2011, refugee men, “were more likely to 
work than their U.S.-born counterparts: 67 percent versus 60 percent … refugee women 
were as likely to work as U.S.-born women.”25 The report further found that in the year 
2000, the income of refugees who have been living in the United States for 20 years was 
comparable to that of natives. It also found as of 2015, the average household income for 
long-term resident refugees was below the average for natives, indicating the 
environment for refugee integration into the economy has become more difficult after the 
Great Recession of 2007–2009.26 These studies indicate there are several factors 
impacting the economic success of refugees to the United States, but they do not 
necessarily collectively work or earn less than economic immigrants or U.S.-born 
workers. 
These studies focused on the immigrants rather than the effects of refugees on the 
larger U.S. economy. Those effects may be difficult to quantify because the number of 
refugees admitted into the country is relatively small as compared to the population of 
economic immigrants and the population of the United States in general. However, they 
do contribute to the overall discussion concerning refugees’ potential fiscal contributions 
or withdrawals to the U.S. economy. Local effects may be easier to identify and 
                                                 
23 J. Edward Taylor et al., “Economic Impact of Refugees,” Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences 113, no. 27 (2016): 7449–7453.  
24 Kalena E. Cortes, “Are Refugees Different from Economic Immigrants? Some Empirical Evidence 
on the Heterogeneity of Immigrant Groups in the United States,” The Review of Economics and Statistics 
86 no. 2 (2004): 465–480.  
25 Randy Capps et al., The Integration Outcomes of U.S. Refugees: Successes and Challenges 
(Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2015), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/.../ 
UsRefugeeOutcomes-FINALWEB.pdf.  
26 Ibid.  
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understand. In 2013, Chmura Economics and Analytics published a report on the 
economic impact of refugees in the Cleveland, Ohio area for the 2012 calendar year. It 
found that while refugee services in the Cleveland area spent approximately $4.8 million 
in 2012, the economic activity of refugees in that area was estimated at $48 million.27 
Therefore, the argument over immigration and its fiscal effects needs to be 
properly scoped. The research shows that nationwide and overall, immigration has either 
a positive or minimal effect on the U.S. economy. Any negative effects appear 
specifically to be in circumstances of first-generation immigrants only and on native-born 
workers with a high school education level or below. The consideration of economic 
migrants is woven throughout immigration policy, current and historical, albeit not 
necessarily based on the conclusions and consensus found in the research. 
2. Historical U.S. Immigration and Refugee Policy 
In 2015, the Panel on the Integration of Immigrants into American Society 
published a summation of historical immigration policy and law, which characterizes 
three general historical periods of U.S. immigration policy evolution. During the first 
century (approximately 1776–1875), immigration regulation rested firmly with states and 
localities.28 As a result, there was wide variation in procedures and citizenship 
nationwide. From the end of the Civil War through much of the 20th century (1875–
1970), immigration federalism began to take shape, and friction grew between the state 
and federal governments over control and regulation of immigration. This friction 
remains today. The 1965 Hart-Celler Act (and other civil rights laws) put the United 
States on an expansionary immigration trajectory starting in the 1970s, but it also served 
as the foundation for the increasingly complex immigration system of the 21st century. 
                                                 
27 Chmura Economics & Analytics, Economic Impact of Refugees in the Cleveland Area (Cleveland, 
OH: Chmura Economics & Analytics, 2013), http://www.hias.org/sites/default/files/ 
clevelandrefugeeeconomic-impact.pdf?_ga=1.191821354.1096693022.1449774105.  
28 Mary C. Waters and Marisa Gerstein Pineau, eds., The Integration of Immigrants into American 
Society (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2015), doi: 10.17226/21746. 
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An analysis by Jaggers, Gabbard, and Jaggers closely follows this timeline.29 The 
authors find an open-door policy during the early years of the nation followed by the eras 
of regulation, restriction, liberalization, and most recently, devolution (starting after 
9/11). The authors characterize devolution as the shift in immigration policy actions from 
the federal to state and local levels. Examples include both expansive and restrictive 
measures. For instance, the Maryland Dream Act expanded rights, offering education 
relief to undocumented immigrant children in Maryland, while the Arizona and Alabama 
passed legislation to restrict the services and employment available to undocumented 
immigrants in those states.  
Contrary to this conventional wisdom, however, Abrams finds that in the early 
years of the nation-building, and in the 19th century specifically, the United States did in 
fact have restrictive and exclusionary immigration laws that were nonfederal in nature.30 
This was especially true for the Western territories that had not yet achieved statehood. 
Abrams makes an important distinction between this era and later periods by noting that 
the purpose of immigration was different during the expansion period than it was later 
when federal exclusionary regulation began. This point highlights the importance of 
understanding the purpose of immigration of a given time for any analysis.  
Additional frameworks for immigration analysis involve the evaluation of legal 
and illegal immigration and the nexus between them. Several sources cite the 1942 
Bracero program, whereby Mexican workers entered the U.S. labor market with 
temporary permits, as well as its implications and effects on illegal immigration.31 For 
instance, Duleep states illegal migration from Mexico soared and became a problem only 
after the program ended.32 Additionally, Duleep also argues that the real question over 
this debate is whether poorly educated immigrants harm the wages and employment of 
                                                 
29 Jeremiah Jaggers, W. Jay Gabbard, and Shanna J. Jaggers, “The Devolution of U.S. Immigration 
Policy: An Examination of the History and Future of Immigration Policy,” Journal of Policy Practice 13, 
no. 1 (2014): 3–15.  
30 Kerry Abrams, “The Hidden Dimension of Nineteenth-Century Immigration Law,” Vanderbilt Law 
Review 62 no. 5 (2009): 1354–1418.  
31 Duleep, “US Immigration Policy at a Crossroads.”  
32 Ibid.  
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poorly educated Americans and that conflicting findings mirror the conflict, 
disagreements, and stalemates found in Congress with respect to immigration law and 
reform.33 Similarly, Massey’s research finds illegal immigration results from poor U.S. 
immigration policy.34 
Following World War II, the United States emerged as more than a military 
powerhouse. It also led the effort to assist and support millions of Europeans forcibly 
displaced from their homes.35 Immigration law expert Maurice A. Roberts provides an 
excellent high-level background of U.S. refugee legislation for the time following the end 
of the war and leading up to 1980.36 In response to the millions of Eastern Europeans 
displaced as a result of World War II, the United States adopted its first emergency 
refugee program with the Displaced Persons Act of 1948.37 The act expired in 1952 and 
was followed by several more ad hoc acts passed to address what was viewed as a 
temporary phenomenon, which did so outside general immigration laws. These include 
the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 and the Refugee-Escapee Act of 1957. Congress objected 
to the continued use of parole power (derived from in the Immigration and Nationality 
Act of 1952) as the mechanism for admitting large groups of refugees, creating the need 
and desire for the first statutory provisions governing the admission of refugees as part of 
permanent immigration law. These provisions were included in the Immigration Act of 
1965. Despite changes, Congress could not foresee the amendment’s failure to meet 
issues posed by refugees from Cuba and Indochina, for example, and the executive 
branch again exercised ad hoc parole authority to address an unforeseen need. The 
Refugee Act of 1980 was designed to meet the deficiencies disclosed by experiences with 
the prior law. 
                                                 
33 Ibid.   
34 Douglas S. Massey, “Chain Reaction: The Causes and Consequences of America’s War on 
Immigrants” (Julian Simon Lecture Series, IZA Annual Migration Meeting, 2011), 
http://conference.iza.org/conference_files/amm2011/massey_d1244.pdf.  
35 “History, Legislative Authority, and Major Administrative Agencies,” Refugee Council USA, 
accessed May 8, 2017, http://www.rcusa.org/history/.  
36 Maurice A. Roberts, “The U.S. and Refugees: The Refugee Act of 1980,” Issue: A Journal of 
Opinion 12, no. 1/2 (1982): 4–6, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1166528.  
37 Ibid.  
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The Refugee Act of 1980 codified in U.S. law the country’s 1968 ratification of 
the 1967 United Nations (UN) Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, and it 
formally created the U.S. refugee resettlement program.38 Other immigration legislation 
followed, such as the Immigration Act of 1990, but this later legislation did not address 
refugees specifically.39 While most scholars summarize U.S. refugee policy as previously 
described, Julian Lim argues this policy history narrative is overly Eurocentric and 
ignores admissions of refugee classes prior to World War II, citing as an example the 
admission of 522 Pershing Chinese refugees to the United States at the southern border in 
1917 despite the current Chinese Exclusion Act.40  
Refugee law allows for a generous amount of discretion by the executive branch. 
On an annual basis, the president consults with Congress and relevant federal agencies to 
designate nationality and processing priorities for refugee resettlement as well as to set 
annual ceilings on the total number of refugee admissions from throughout the world.41 
Immigration law attorney and published author Arnold Leibowitz highlights how this 
aspect of the Refugee Act as written makes refugee admissions an inherently political 
process.42 Salehyan and Roseblum further explain, “it is widely recognized that the 
granting of refugee and asylum status is more than a humanitarian act and that doing so 
has important foreign policy implications.”43 By admitting refugees, the United States is 
forced to acknowledge human rights issues in the country of origin, presenting strategic 
international relations challenges.44 More broadly, Lim states, “in contrast to refugee 
                                                 
38 Donald Kerwin, The Faltering US Refugee Protection System: Legal and Policy Responses to 
Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Others in Need of Protection (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 
2011), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/refugeeprotection-2011.pdf.  
39 “History of U.S. Immigration Laws,” Federation for American Immigration Reform. accessed May 
22, 2017, http://www.fairus.org/facts/us_laws.  
40 Julian Lim, “Immigration, Asylum, and Citizenship: A More Holistic Approach,” California Law 
Review 101, no. 4 (2013): 1013–1077.  
41 “History, Legislative Authority,” Refugee Council USA.  
42 Arnold H. Leibowitz, “The Refugee Act of 1980: Problems and Congressional Concerns,” The 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 467, no. 1 (1983): 163–171.  
43 Idean Salehyan and Marc R Rosenblum, “International Relations, Domestic Politics, and Asylum 
Admissions in the United States,” Political Research Quarterly 61, no. 1 (2008): 104–121.  
44 Ibid.  
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law, which looks abroad to see who can be pulled in, immigration law looks inside the 
nation to see who should be kept out.”45 He also argues, “the two bodies of law are thus 
treated as embodying different legal and normative foundations, furthering divergent 
policy agendas, and relying on separate legal rules.”46 
The Center for Migration Studies’ Executive Director Donald M. Kerwin argues 
that since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, security has driven immigration policy 
development but protection policies, such as those for refugees, have not kept pace.47 Yet 
there is a clear need for such policies. In 2016, Dadush and Niebuhr found the major 
international implications of forced migrations are numerous, “from the risk of 
radicalization and political instability, to the spread of infectious diseases, and to the risk 
of collapse of the visa-free European Schengen zone.”48 
3. The United States and Human Rights in the World 
Research reveals American government attitudes and actions toward international 
human rights issues are inconsistent. Andrew Moravcsik states, “U.S. efforts to enforce 
global human rights standards through rhetorical disapproval, foreign aid, sanctions, 
military intervention, and even multilateral negotiations are arguably more vigorous than 
those of any other country.”49 However, Bradley, Rubenfeld, and others point out that 
these efforts are often rhetorical. For example, the United States was significantly 
involved in establishing the UN and the first conventions on international rights, but for 
over a decade, it refused to join any of the major human rights and antigenocide 
conventions.50 While both international and domestic issues of the times must be 
considered for context, Bradley argues this complicated U.S. relationship with human 
                                                 
45 Lim, “Immigration, Asylum, and Citizenship.”  
46 Ibid.  
47 Kerwin, The Faltering US Refugee Protection System.  
48 Uri Dadush and Mona Niebuhr, The Economic Impact of Forced Migration (Washington, DC: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016), http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/04/22/economic-
impact-of-forced-migration-pub-63421.  
49 Andrew Moravcsik, “The Paradox of U.S. Human Rights Policy,” in American Exceptionalism and 
Human Rights, ed. Michael Ignatieff (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 147–197.  
50 Jed Rubenfeld, “The Two World Orders,” Wilson Quarterly 27, no. 4 (2003): 22–36, 
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rights, and with treaties specifically, stems from the subtle features of the U.S. 
constitutional system.51 Paul Kahn asserts that there is a deep and complex opposition 
between constitutional law and international law.52 Separately, Bradley and Rubenfeld 
both contend U.S. ambivalence and reluctance to join major human rights conventions 
are rooted in the aversion to big government and government overreach.53 Moravcsik 
supports this explanation, stating, “U.S. ambivalence toward international human rights 
commitments is not a short-term and contingent aspect of specific American policies. It is 
instead woven into the deep structural reality of American political life.”54 Glenn 
Mitoma, Assistant Professor of Human Rights and Education at the University of 
Connecticut, offers a slight variance in perspective, arguing U.S. constitutional law, 
politics, and civic society have all contributed to the United States’ unique and 
contradictory relationship with international human rights.55  
The characterization of the United States as ambivalent on human rights is 
supported in modern history as well. In 1992, former President Jimmy Carter challenged 
the United States government to do more to comply with international human rights laws, 
highlighting the nearly two decades of work to ratify the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, which establishes universal standards for the protection of basic civil 
and political liberties, making the United States the last industrialized democracy to join 
the UN Human Rights Committee.56 Additionally, The Economist published an article in 
2013 explaining the United States has failed to ratify the UN convention on children’s 
                                                 
51 Curtis Bradley, “The United States and Human Rights Treaties: Race Relations, the Cold War, and 
Constitutionalism,” Chinese Journal of International Law 9, no. 2 (2010): 321–344.  
52 Paul W. Kahn, Speaking Law to Power: Popular Sovereignty, Human Rights, and the New 
International Order, Faculty Scholarship Series (New Haven, CT: Yale Law School, 2000), 
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rights because some senators believed it would impinge on American sovereignty.57 
According to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the children’s 
rights convention went into force in 1990; the United States signed the convention in 
1995 but has yet to ratify it.58 Of the 18 international human rights treaties of the UN, the 
United States has ratified fewer than any other developed democratic nations in the world 
(see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1.  Ratification of 18 International Human Rights Treaties.59 
                                                 
57 “Why Won’t America Ratify the UN Convention on Children’s Rights?” The Economist, October 7, 
2013, http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/10/economist-explains-2.  
58 “Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,” United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, accessed May 13, 2017, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/pages/home.aspx. Ratification means to be 
legally bound to the provisions.  
59 Source: “Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard,” United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, accessed April 29, 2017, http://indicators.ohchr.org.  
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Despite criticism, the United States remains home to “the largest and most active 
community of nongovernmental organizations and foundations devoted to human rights 
promotion in the world today.”60 A Migration Policy Institute report found in 2013, the 
United States accepted two-thirds of the 98,000 refugees who were permanently resettled 
that year worldwide.61  
These contradictions and competing frameworks are complicated by the relatively 
newly considered concept of soft power. Mitoma argues the “growing importance of the 
United States and the emergence of human rights as an organizing principle of the 
Second World War opened up a space for a new kind of transnational politics aimed at 
cultivating and channeling U.S. influence in the world.”62 The United States has now 
moved out of the Cold War and into the post-9/11 era. Wikan finds that despite evidence 
nations “prioritize security interests over adherence to international norms, there is no 
evidence that this has weakened the underlying HR [human rights] norms or disrupted the 
institutions of the HR regime” (body of international human rights laws).63 As previously 
cited, however, the United States is legally bound to fewer international human rights 
laws than any other developed democracy. Conversely, Narjis Khan finds the normative 
meaning of human rights has been seriously undermined by various actions taken by the 
UN following 9/11.64  
While there may be argument over the existence or extent of human rights 
violations by the U.S government on its citizens in the years following 9/11, there is little 
literature regarding its negative effect on the U.S. international human rights rhetoric.65 
                                                 
60 Moravcsik, “The Paradox of U.S. Human Rights Policy.”  
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Paul Kahn asserts human rights law in the post-World War II and Cold War eras was, in 
large part, “a rhetorical project caught up in larger ideological battles.”66 Richard Falk 
contends that in recent years, the United States has championed human rights in rhetoric 
yet ignored and violated these same rights when they conflict with a desired national 
strategy and policy, especially following the 9/11 attacks.67  
The challenge posed by reconciling contradicting international human rights 
rhetoric and actions is mirrored by the contradictions between the U.S. historical identity 
as an immigrant nation and it restrictive immigration policies. While Americans celebrate 
this national immigrant heritage, immigration also prompts concern for the preservation 
of a national identity.68 Refugee policy is complicated by these contradictions, in addition 
to post-9/11 security concerns and America’s complicated relationship with human rights 
on the international stage. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW SUMMARY 
The United States has a unique historical relationship with human rights issues 
and actions. It has rhetorically championed human rights through the world and provided 
more economic aid than any other country, either multilaterally or directly. Yet it lags 
behind all other developed democracies in its ratification of human rights treaties. This 
may be due to the nature of the U.S. government structure, which renders even seemingly 
benign issues as deeply political. The setting is further complicated by sensitive 
international relations and the need to maintain important international ties as means of 
retaining global power. Not surprisingly, U.S. refugee policy is a highly politicized issue.  
This literature review demonstrates the need to explore whether refugee policy 
should indeed be a political issue as well as what effects this policy has on the U.S. 
international standing of power. As a result of this inherent politicization, looking outside 
to other countries’ refugee policies could be beneficial to U.S. policy makers. Existing 
                                                 
66 Kahn, Speaking Law to Power.  
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literature analyzes the mass refugee migrations on several host countries, their policies, 
and the corresponding effects.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The object of this study is to find solutions to the challenges facing the United 
States regarding its refugee policy in the context of the world today. Despite many 
attempts, the United States has not initiated large-scale immigration reform since the 
1960s (and on a smaller scale, since the late 1980s), despite the changing world. The 
government has failed to do so due to its inability to reconcile competing interests and 
narratives. This thesis first analyzes the two predominant themes in refugee policy 
discourse: the threats to the economy and to security. It then uses a comparative case 
study method to examine the evidence for the two claims in countries that face a similar 
situation in responding to displaced people and refugee mass migration. The two case 
studies are the current and recent refugee immigration policies of Canada and Germany. 
This thesis analyzes elements of these countries’ refugee policies as well as their 
successes and failures. This study then considers whether these findings could be applied 
to the United States to help understand the flaws and successes in U.S. immigration 
policy as it relates to homeland security, as well as how to possibly overcome them. The 
selections are based on criteria of equal development, similar democratic institutions, and 
similar refugee pressures. The selected countries represent both the North American 
continent as well as Europe. 
The measure of performance in each case study rests on consensus or lack of 
consensus among analytical and evaluative literature. Economic data and other evidence 
clearly linked to identified refugee policies of that country determined its policy success 
or failure within each country. This data came from economic and social science journals, 
government documents, and periodicals as well as public opinion surveys taken by 
organizations such as the Pew Center. This thesis considers the ability of the United 
States to take guidance and incorporate the refugee policies of other nation states into 
U.S. policy.  
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F. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter II provides relevant background information pertaining to the refugee 
laws, policies, and programs of the United States and discusses national discourse and 
reform failures. Chapter III explores the economic and security implications of refugees 
in the United States. Chapter IV presents Canada and Germany as case studies of refugee 
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II. WHERE WE ARE: 
HISTORY OF U.S. AMERICAN IMMIGRATION 
Immigration is a vast and dynamic domain; its law is complex and its history rich 
and storied. The immigration laws, policies, history, culture, and perceptions in the 
United States are intricately related to world events, domestic events, the political 
climate, the economy, and collective national values. With this understanding, Chapter II 
provides a summary of historical and current refugee law, policies, and practices in the 
United States, demonstrating the reactionary, improvised, and meandering nature of 
immigration policy in the United States. It also discusses the refugee resettlement and 
integration process as well as the prevailing discourse and claims regarding refugees and 
related policy. Additionally, this chapter offers a view into refugee laws and reform and 
shows that the process for refugee resettlement is not necessarily broken. Rather, the 
problem lies in the selection of whom the United States permits to enter that process, and 
when it chooses to do so. Historically, political objectives, short-term thinking, and, at 
times, ad hoc decision making have driven these selections. The process lacks long-term 
strategy and careful employment of research and sound evidence in such decisions.  
A. REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY HISTORY SINCE WORLD WAR II 
While immigration law and policy history in the United States as it applies to 
refugees is voluminous, most of the literature on the subject highlights several key 
legislative acts that shaped the current system. As discussed in Chapter I, Congress 
enacted the first significant refugee law and policy in the United States, the Displaced 
Persons Act of 1948, as an emergency response to the millions of Europeans refugees 
following World War II. The act expired in 1952, the same year the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, also referred to as the McCarran-Walter Act, passed. The 
INA was enacted at the beginning of the Cold War, a time characterized by the threat of 
communism; therefore, it largely reflected the belief that immigration was a threat to 
national security, as foreigners could be spies or introduce communist ideas into the 
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United States.69 The INA reinforced existing discriminatory and restrictive quota systems 
first put in place in 1924, restricting the number of immigrant visas issued based on an 
applicant’s national origin.70 It is most notable for collecting and codifying many existing 
provisions of immigration law and reorganizing the structure of those laws.71 The INA 
was virtually silent on refugees and asylum seekers, reflecting the reactive, temporary, 
and limited approach to refugee admissions. Although it has been significantly amended 
several times since its inception, the INA continues to serve as the basic body of 
immigration law in the United States.72 
Following the expiration of the Displaced Persons Act in 1952, refugee policy 
continued on an ad hoc basis to address what was viewed as a temporary phenomenon 
and emergency, and it did so outside general immigration law.73 For example, the 
Refugee Relief Act of 1953 expanded admissions to victims of national disasters and 
those fleeing communism abroad.74 Later, the Hungarian Refugee Act of 1956, the 
Refugee-Escapee Act of 1957, and the Cuban Adjustment Program of the 1960s also 
provided for the immigration of persons fleeing communist countries.75 While the 
acceptance of large numbers of refugees fleeing communist regimes was not without 
controversy, the interesting paradox is while the United States viewed immigrants as 
potential national security threats, the country viewed anticommunist refugees with less 
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skepticism.76 Some scholars argue one of the United States’ tactics in the Cold War was 
to encourage defectors from the Soviet Union and its allied regimes through the growth 
and expansion of the United States refugee apparatus.77 Refugee policy has therefore 
never been strictly humanitarian in nature or motivation. Cavosie comments, “Countries 
hostile to the United States have invariably been accorded United States protection while 
equally worthy refugees from friendly countries have met with far less success.”78 
Whenever the United States makes a decision to accept refugees from a particular 
country, it is making a political statement about that country’s government, which may or 
may not be in the foreign policy interest of the United States.79 In these ways, refugee 
admissions have been used, at least in part, as geopolitical tools. Given the ever-changing 
and shifting nature of geopolitics, it is not surprising that admission actions and policies 
have been reactive and inconsistent.  
President Dwight D. Eisenhower established the precedent for using the executive 
parole designation power contained in the INA of 1952 for mass admissions of 
refugees.80 In 1956, his administration broadly interpreted the parole authority granted to 
the attorney general by § 212(d)(5) of the INA to provide refuge to the Hungarian 
freedom fighters and permit them entrance collectively as refugees.81 This provision 
allowed the president to permit otherwise inadmissible non-citizens entry into the United 
States based on “a compelling emergency or urgent humanitarian reason,” and to do so en 
                                                 
76 “Refugee Policies—Refugees and the Cold War,” Encyclopedia of the New American Nation, 
accessed October 29, 2017, http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/O-W/Refugee-Policies-Refugees-
and-the-cold-war.html.  
77 Rebecca Hamlin and Philip E Wolgin, “Symbolic Politics and Policy Feedback: The United Nations 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees and American Refugee Policy in the Cold War,” International 
Migration Review 46, no. 3 (2012): 586–624.  
78 J. Michael Cavosie, “Defending the Golden Door: The Persistence of Ad Hoc and Ideological 
Decision Making in U.S. Refugee Law,” Indiana Law Journal 67, no. 2 (1992): 411–439.  
79 Matthew E. Price, “Persecution Complex: Justifying Asylum Law’s Preference for Persecuted 
People,” Harvard International Law Journal 47, no. 2 (S2006): 413–466. 
80 Leibowitz, “The Refugee Act of 1980,” 165; “Refugee Policies—Refugees and the Cold War.”  
81 Leibowitz, “The Refugee Act of 1980,” 165.  
 24
masse.82 Under the provision, parolees are allowed to remain in the United States; 
however, they are not provided permanent resident alien or refugee status under the 
law.83 Congress later passed legislation to designate parolees as refugees under the law.84  
On July 21, 1961, seeking to secure support for current assistance programs for 
refugees, escapees, migrants, and other selected persons, and for any future programs as 
the need arose, President John F. Kennedy submitted a draft bill to Congress.85 In 
response, Congress enacted the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act (MRA) of 1962, 
which authorized Congress to appropriate funds to provide certain assistance to refugees, 
principally those fleeing communist and Soviet Union-allied regimes.86 The MRA of 
1962 further provides the president authority to designate assistance funds to meet 
unexpected urgent refugee and migration needs.87  
The Immigration Act of 1965, also known as the Hart-Celler Act, responded to 
criticisms that quota systems were racist and counter to American values by making 
significant amendments to the INA. This act removed national origin quotas and created 
admission classes, designating refugees as the seventh and last immigration preference 
category.88 However, this formally brought refugees into the immigration preference 
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system.89 The INA of 1965 also attempted to somewhat restrict the president’s parole 
powers, but presidents have continued to use this discretionary power successfully to set 
refugee agendas and admissions.90 
In 1975, at the end of the Vietnam War, Congress enacted the Indochina 
Migration and Refugee Assistance Act to provide refuge for Southeast Asians displaced 
as a result of the war. Although as individuals they would have been eligible for 
admission under the seventh immigrant preference under the INA of 1965 for fleeing 
communist regimes, the magnitude of the number of those seeking refuge was so high 
that parole was the only available option for their admission.91 In just a few years, annual 
admissions of Southeast Asian refugees exponentially increased with most admitted 
under the attorney general’s ad hoc parole authority.92 In fact, “parole programs for 
Indochinese refugees were authorized or extended by the Attorney General ten times 
between” 1975 and 1980, totaling approximately 360,000 refugee admissions.93 The 
Refugee Act of 1980 was passed in response to this broad use of parole authority coupled 
with the congressional desire for participation in the decision-making process for refugee 
admissions beyond normal flow, and the need to address this continued refugee flow.94 
The act provided an official legal framework for refugee admissions, but it also 
maintained much of the ad hoc nature of those admissions and therefore only marginally 
increasing Congress’s role and involvement in those decisions.95  
The Refugee Act of 1980 remains the most substantial refugee legislation to date. 
Lee notes it aimed to “centralize refugee admissions by ending the executive branch’s 
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power to parole an unlimited number of refugees,” as had been the previous practice.96 
The act amended the INA yet again, separating refugee admissions from overall 
immigrant quotas, expanding who may be considered a refugee, and setting up broad and 
thorough procedures for processing them.97 In 1968, the United States became a party to 
the 1967 UN Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, and the Refugee Act of 1980 
codified this as well as established the refugee resettlement program.98 The act also 
amended the MRA of 1962 to establish small changes toward more uniform funding for 
refugee assistance.99  
Although the Refugee Act of 1980 reigned in much of the executive parole power, 
U.S. presidents retain the ability to increase (or decrease) refugee admissions in exigent 
circumstances.100 Executive power also includes setting the annual refugee admissions 
ceiling in consultation with Congress.101 Under Title 8, §1157 (a)(2), of the U.S. Code,  
The number of refugees who may be admitted … in any fiscal year after 
fiscal year 1982 shall be such number as the President determines, before 
the beginning of the fiscal year and after appropriate consultation, is 
justified by humanitarian concerns or is otherwise in the national 
interest.102  
This provision defines “appropriate consultation” as in-person discussions by designated 
cabinet-level representatives of the president with members of the House and Senate 
Committees on the Judiciary.103 Specifically, the Departments of State (DOS), Homeland 
Security (DHS), and Health and Human Services (HHS) provide Congress a report on 
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behalf of the president with the annual recommended refugee admission limit 
consideration of refugee processing capabilities.104 
Executive power can be used to either restrict or expand refugee admissions. For 
instances, the Obama administration increased the admission ceiling from 70,000 in fiscal 
year (FY) 2015 to 85,000 in FY 2016 and increased it further to 110,000 for FY 2017, 
marking the largest annual increases since 1990.105 However, President Donald Trump’s 
Executive Order 13780 on March 6, 2017, “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist 
Entry into the United States,” reduced the FY 2017 ceiling to 50,000.106 This was the 
lowest ceiling since the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980.107 A State Department 
briefing published the Trump administration’s intent to cap refugee admissions for FY 
2018 to an even more historic low of 45,000.108 The ceiling limits the maximum 
admissions per year and is not a binding commitment.109 The Trump administration’s 
March 2017 revised executive order bans travel of refugees from six countries (Iran, 
Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen) to the United States unless they have 
established bona fide relationships to the United States.110  
These executive orders and the legal challenges to them demonstrate that despite 
the intent of the Refugee Act of 1980, refugee policy in the United States remains ad hoc 
and inconsistent. Moreover, U.S. refugee policy continues to be dynamic, reactive, and 
somewhat subject to unilateral executive power. While the ability to respond with some 
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flexibility to the threats and challenges of the day is important, this flexibility makes 
refugee policy to be extremely political, unilateral and unbalanced (strong in the 
executive balance), and disruptive to the continuity and effectiveness of refugee 
operations.  
B. LIMITS AND DIFFERENCES IN TERMS: REFUGEE VERSUS ASYLEE  
The Refugee Act of 1980 also established two paths for foreign nationals to seek 
and obtain refuge in the United States―as either a refugee or an asylee (or asylum 
seeker).111 Both refugees and asylees are those people, “who are unable or unwilling to 
return to their country of origin or nationality because of persecution or a well-founded 
fear of persecution.”112 In the United States, the difference between a refugee and an 
asylee is largely a procedural one.113 Refugees are physically located outside the country 
while asylum seekers are already present within U.S. borders at the time of 
application.114 Although the president, with approval from Congress, sets the ceiling for 
refugee admissions annually, there is no ceiling for asylum claims and status.115 This 
thesis considers both refugees and asylum seekers in its analysis and discussion but 
focuses primarily on policy and research specific to refugees. 
C. THE REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT PROCESS  
The refugee program and process is an inherently international one, requiring 
coordination, cooperation, and effort from many different nations, international bodies, 
and nongovernmental organizations. Even within the United States, multiple agencies and 
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entities share various responsibilities as they relate to the U.S. asylum and refugee 
program (see Figure 2). These include the DOS, DHS, and HHS. 
 
Figure 2.  U.S. Refugee Admissions Program Partners and their Roles.116 
Persons who are fleeing persecution in their home countries and wish to resettle in 
the United States generally follow a multistep process (see Appendix). Potential refugees 
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are referred primarily to the United States through the UNHCR.117 In some cases, a U.S. 
embassy or designated nongovernmental organizations may refer a refugee applicant.118 
The UNHCR completes its own rigorous initial screening process to identify those 
refugees who meet the definition set forth under the 1951 Refugee Convention and are 
determined the most vulnerable and in greatest need of resettlement.119 Less than one 
percent of the global refugee population meets these screening standards and is referred 
by the UNHCR.120  
Resettlement support centers receive and process each referred case, conduct 
interviews, verify data, and gather and enter applicant information into the DOS’s 
Worldwide Refugee Admission Processing System (WRAPS) for the security checks.121 
U.S. national security agencies screen the applicant based on the information provided in 
WRAPS. According to DOS, refugee applicants are screened more carefully than any 
other type of traveler to the United States.122 DHS Citizenship and Immigration Services 
officers review the screening results, collect biometric data from the applicants, conduct 
in-person interviews, and adjudicate the cases. Officers conditionally approved those 
applicants adjudicated as refugees for resettlement pending favorable medical and 
security checks; while those are denied cannot appeal the decision but may request 
reconsideration based on new information.123 If the results of biometric security checks 
and a medical examination are favorable, the applicant may complete a cultural 
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orientation course, ranging in duration from several hours to several days.124 The 
orientation is designed to teach refugees about U.S. culture, customs, and practices.125 
Domestic resettlement locations are identified and travel is planned. The originating RSC 
and the International Organization for Migration organize and arrange transport.126 In 
general, the International Organization for Migration provides refugees travel loans to 
pay for transportation costs to the United States and refugees agree to pay back the 
interest-free loan starting six months after arrival.127 
D. INTEGRATION 
The resettlement process for refugees does not end after their cases have been 
positively adjudicated. Each refugee approved for admission by DHS is sponsored by one 
of nine domestic resettlement agencies operating under the Reception and Placement 
Program through a public-private cooperative agreement.128 Representatives of these 
agencies meet weekly to review cases sent by resettlement support centers abroad to 
match each refugee’s needs with appropriate local community resources or with family 
members, if applicable.129 Together, these agencies have affiliates in 190 communities 
throughout the United States.130 According to Refugee Council USA, each sponsoring 
agency is responsible for ensuring refugees receive, “food, housing, clothing, 
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employment services, follow-up medical care, and other necessary services” during the 
first 30–90 days after arrival.131  
HHS’ Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) largely provides integration 
services beyond the refugee’s first 90 days in the United States. ORR  
provides time-limited cash and medical assistance to new arrivals, as well 
as support for case management services, English as a Foreign Language 
classes, and job readiness and employment services―all designed to 
facilitate refugees’ successful transition to life in the U.S. and help them to 
attain self-sufficiency.132  
However, these programs have faced difficultly in securing and maintaining adequate 
funding.133 Individual states also provide some form of refugee assistance and receive 
programmatic oversight and guidance by ORR.134  
Refugees receive work authorization immediately upon case approval and may 
apply for legal permanent residence after one year and U.S. citizenship after five years. 
DOS notes gaining employment quickly is important for a refugee’s integration into 
society but acknowledges most refugees start in entry-level jobs, even if they possess 
high-level skills or education.135 The burden for achieving successful and meaningful 
integration is generally placed on private and nongovernmental entities. Consequently, 
tracking, meaningful measures, and assessments of relative success of refugee integration 
is limited.  
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E. NATIONAL DISCOURSE AND CLAIMS 
Immigration has been a controversial political issue in the United States 
throughout its history.136 Various groups argue contradictory and competing narratives 
within and among themselves and over time. For example, while the United States 
collectively tends to reflect on periods of restrictive immigration policies with judgment 
while honoring the contributions of immigrants to the founding and development of the 
country, over the last 50 years a great majority of Americans have continued to tell 
pollsters that immigration levels should remain at or below their present levels.137 In 
specific areas of immigration policy, however, public opinion polls reflect more varying 
and shifting attitudes. These polls find  
Americans regularly change their minds about immigration. While certain 
political and demographic subgroups are fairly constant in their opinions, 
overall attitudes can shift sharply in response to changes in the economy, 
fears of terrorism, organized media campaigns, the way the issue is framed 
and the centrality of the issue to debates in Congress.138  
Perhaps one constant and universal view is that the United States is in need of 
immigration reform.139 
Political scientists acknowledge the United States has historically resisted changes 
to immigration policies.140 Despite efforts by both major political parties over the past 
quarter century to overhaul and improve the current immigration system, reform has 
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proven elusive and difficult to achieve. Indeed, the last significant immigration reform 
occurred with the Immigration and Reform Act of 1986.141 However, this is not due to a 
lack of trying. There have been several attempts at reform under the last two presidential 
administrations of Bush and Obama, but those attempts have ultimately failed. For 
example, the failure to pass the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors 
(DREAM) Act during both administrations is largely attributed to congressional and 
political gridlock and disagreements over differing approaches to immigration.142 So 
strong has the frustration and also the need for reform been that since the late 1980s state 
and local jurisdictions have responded to the federal inaction and deadlock with their own 
immigration policies.143 
This inability to achieve reform is a consequence of major and pervasive opposing 
narratives in U.S. immigration discourse. American society generally holds many strong 
and opposing psychological narratives about immigrants and the immigration system.144 
Americans define their country as a nation of immigrants but simultaneously view 
immigrants as a threat to jobs and security.145 The question of whether immigration is 
beneficial or detrimental to the economy persists.146 Likewise, claims regarding the 
effects, if any, of immigrants on crime in the United States have abounded for much of 
the country’s history and remain front and center in today’s discourse.147 Stephen Miller, 
President Trump’s chief policy advisor, argues welcoming refugees is too costly and 
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poses terrorism concerns.148  In this way, refugee policy in the White House is currently 
driven by one extreme of these opposing narratives. 
The combination of a post-9/11 United States with the Syrian war refugee crisis 
has perpetuated a contemporary claim that refugees pose a greater risk of terrorism and 
national security threats to the United States than native-born Americans.149 Indeed, 
evidence suggests the 9/11 terrorist attacks significantly impacted U.S. cultural and 
societal views on security and immigrants.150 The attacks created a strong political divide 
and gridlock between proponents of enforcement of immigration law and proponents of 
expanded benefits.151 Reconciling these contradictory and competing narratives is 
challenging for both private citizens and policy makers alike.  
Although most citizens and politicians seem to agree that reform is necessary, and 
despite some agreement on certain aspects such as addressing undocumented aliens, 
cohesiveness and agreement break down in the details of these broad ideas.152 It is in this 
space where these competing narratives and discourse stake claim and become corrosive 
and divisive, hindering the ability to reform immigration. Seventy percent of voters in the 
2016 presidential election reported immigration as a very important issue to them—the 
economy was first at 84 percent, and terrorism second at 80 percent.153 These numbers 
are significant because the issues of the economy and terrorism are the two largest issues 
leveraged by politicians in the immigration debate. While debate over policy continues, 
the literature generally finds consensus in the answers to the questions about the 
economic and security implications of immigrants. 
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F. CHAPTER CONCLUSION  
Like other areas of immigration law, refugee law developed on an ad hoc, as-
needed basis. The United States has never definitively laid out its national strategic 
immigration plans or priorities. The competing narratives over the effect of immigrants 
on American society, throughout history and now, have likely made this a contentious 
and complicated task. Still, most Americans and elected representatives acknowledge and 
honor the importance of immigrants in building and sustaining the country, past and 
present. The purpose here is not to search for or provide an explanation for the historical 
and current U.S. refugee laws, policies, and attitudes but to acknowledge them when 
analyzing the problems facing the United States. 
Immigration and refugee law, policy, and processes provide a basic understanding 
of how the system is designed to work and the legal boundaries within which it must 
operate. Nevertheless, the basis for these policies and programs is not predicated on 
empirical research, case studies, or data and statistics. The reactive history of refugee 
policy and executive actions show American refugee policy is inextricably linked to 
homeland security concerns as well as international relations—especially since the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11. A holistic analysis of the economic and security threat posed by 
refugees is required to answer the questions of how the United States compares to Canada 
and Germany in its approach to refugees and what the U.S. strategic plan for refugees 




III. EVALUATING THE CLAIMS: IMPLICATIONS OF 
REFUGEES ON U.S. ECONOMY AND SECURITY 
The reasons for the unclear, ad hoc, and often contradictory U.S. refugee policy 
lie in confusing and contradictory national narratives regarding refugees. Although the 
American public and its elected representatives generally agree that immigration reform 
is overdue, attempts to achieve this reform have been unsuccessful. The government has 
yet to reach a consensus on the nature of reform and therefore has not enacted any 
immigration laws. Differences in fundamental understandings of the effect of 
immigration, and refugees in particular, on the United States have yet to be reconciled. 
This chapter focuses on the two most pervasive and consequential areas of disagreement 
among policy makers as they relate to refugee policy: the effects of refugees on the U.S. 
economy and on national security. Although consensus is often lacking in news media 
reports and political debates, research on the effects of refugees on the economy and 
national security is abundant and its findings consistent.  
A. ECONOMY 
Consideration of public finance and budgeting is crucial to public administration. 
Although the admission and resettlement of refugees into the United States is primarily a 
humanitarian program, an analysis of refugee policy should include an assessment and 
understanding of the fiscal implications of those policies. This is especially crucial when 
economic claims are cited as the basis for such policies. As previously discussed, 
discourse in the United States and around the world often cites the financial burden 
refugees place on nation states as cause to curb or limit refugee admissions.154 As this 
work assumes the United States seeks to maintain its welcoming immigration and 
humanitarian legacy by continuing to accept refugees, it is prudent to look for ways to 
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maximize the net positive fiscal benefits for the U.S. economy. This chapter identifies 
broad claims regarding refugees as they relate to fiscal costs and gains, it evaluates 
research on the economic and fiscal effects of refugees in the United States, and it 
discusses the implications.  
1. The Claim: Refugees are Bad for the Economy 
Refugees are humanitarian immigrants, requiring humanitarian programs.  As 
with any humanitarian program, fiscal considerations cannot be avoided. The long-
standing claim that refugees are a burden on a host country’s economy has been 
invigorated by the recent mass displacement of Syrian refugees, and echoed by world 
leaders, including the United States. In his address to the UN General Assembly on 
September 19, 2017, President Trump argued refugees should be resettled near their 
home countries because from an economic perspective, 10 refugees in the Middle East 
could be helped for the cost of resettling one in the United States.155 This claim is rooted 
in a 2015 report by the Center for Immigration Studies (CIS), a special interest 
organization advocating for lower immigration levels.156 President Trump’s statement led 
the news media to investigate and produce other reports, such as a 2017 HHS study that 
found refugees were net fiscal contributors to the United States.157 However, President 
Trump’s senior policy advisor, Stephen Miller, intervened to prevent the study from 
being published.158 The CIS report was used to validate and perpetuate the narrative that 
refugees in the United States are a financial burden as well as to support predetermined 
domestic and foreign policy.159 Though not to the egregious extent we see today, 
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refugees have been held hostage to political games before. In 1975, President Gerald 
Ford faced some political resistance to the resettlement of refugees from Indochina.160 At 
the time, unemployment was high throughout the country, and states such as California 
initially resisted refugee resettlement, in part, on this basis.161 It may also be worth noting 
that the governor of California at the time, Jerry Brown, was a Democrat, and Gerald 
Ford was a Republican.  
Such examples of politicized immigration and refugee policy illustrate that 
objective empirical research is oftentimes omitted or suppressed from consideration when 
setting public policy for immigration and refugees. This omission is to the detriment of 
the United States and its people who are left with stalled reform, a lack of continuity in 
policies, and without an immigration and refugee strategy.  
2. The Evidence 
While research abounds in the field of immigration and economics, there is 
relatively little available research specifically concerning the effects of refugees on their 
host country economies. Many factors make appraising the economic impact of admitted 
refugees challenging. First, the sample size is relatively minor, as refugees make up a 
small proportion of all migrants.162 Second, the mobile nature of this population, coupled 
with the uncertainty of duration and admission status in a host country, makes estimating 
and tracking refugees and asylum seekers difficult.163 Moreover, research sampling 
presents other challenges to interpreting findings, such as consideration of how long each 
particular refugee has been living in the United States and what the general economic 
conditions were at the time and place of the refugee’s arrival. Because states also 
maintain some economic data for refugees, tracking challenges may be exacerbated if a 
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refugee moves to a different state and their existing data becomes lost or incomplete. 
These are only some of the challenges in performing comprehensive economic refugee 
research on a large scale.  
As discussed in Chapter I, overall immigration has a neutral or net positive effect 
on the U.S. economy. Research conducted on the economic effects of refugees in the 
United States generally finds similar and consistent results. Admitting and resettling new 
refugees require short-term expenditures. These government/public sector expenditures 
include providing food, housing, basic income support, healthcare, social services, and 
some sort of training and orientation classes for societal and integration into the labor 
market.164 The extent to which these expenditures can be transformed into investments 
and yield a net positive for the host country’s economy depends on how quickly refugees 
enter and integrate into the labor market.165  
Research finds that over time, the fiscal effect of refugees on the U.S. economy is 
net positive. For example, a recent study found the average refugee is a financial drain on 
the government for their first eight years but becomes a net positive contributor to the 
economy by the ninth year and on.166 Over a period of 20 years, the United States 
receives an average net fiscal benefit of $21,195 per refugee.167 One reason why the CIS 
report is misleading is because it considered only refugees within their first five years. In 
fact, five years is the period elapsing before refugee income begins to sharply rise and 
those initial costs are offset.168 This long-term positive momentum continues for 
subsequent generations. The children of refugees economically perform on par or better 
than other native-born workers. For example, in 1976, a large wave of Vietnamese “boat 
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people” arrived in the United States seeking refuge.169 Today, Vietnamese Americans, 
most of whom are second-generation refugees, have unemployment rates lower than the 
national unemployment rate.170 Furthermore, Vietnamese American income is higher 
than the average American income.171 
Research at the local level finds examples of similar positive economic effects 
from refugees. For advanced economies such as the United States, Chmura Economics 
and Analytics find, “once refugees have adjusted to their new life after resettlement, they 
can provide substantial contributions to the workforce and economic development in the 
long run at the regional level.”172 In May of 1980, approximately 125,000 refugees fled 
persecution in Cuba and arrived in Miami in small boats.173 Although the influx added a 
significant seven percent to Miami’s labor force, there was no effect on wages or 
unemployment rates, while the city’s consumer base and labor force increased.174 
Additionally, a study of the economic impact of refugees in the Cleveland, Ohio area 
found that in 2012, an investment of $4.8 million in refugee aid services yielded $48 
million in economic activity, a net fiscal gain of $43.2 million.175 In St. Louis, Missouri, 
an influx of Bosnian refugees in the 1990s transformed the neighborhood of Bevo Mill 
from one of crime and abandoned buildings to a community with lower crime and 
unemployment rates than the general population.176 St. Louis University found 
immigrants in this area earned approximately 25 percent higher incomes than native-born 
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Americans and surpassed local natives in likelihood of being entrepreneurs, skilled 
workers, and possessing advanced degrees.177 
Researchers have reached similar conclusions at the state level. For instance, 
research for the period 1990 through 2012 found refugees in Tennessee were positive 
fiscal contributors for the state, generating $1.3 billion in tax revenues.178 This generated 
revenue is almost twice as much as those refugees consumed in state-funded services.179 
In 2015, refugees in California contributed almost $2 billion in state and local taxes.180 
Places such as Miami, Cleveland, St. Louis, Tennessee, and California provide sound and 
compelling case studies that are important in developing informed refugee policy. 
One concern over the admission of large numbers of refugees is that they will be a 
pervasive public burden over the course of their lives and residence in the United States. 
Indeed, the CIS report calls attention to refugees and welfare use.181 Refugees’ 
participation in social service programs, such as food stamps and welfare, declines as the 
length of their U.S residence increases––although refugees tend to initially rely more on 
these services than their native-born counterparts.182 However, this tendency, when 
considered with the consensus of research on the short- and long-term effects of refugees 
on the U.S. economy, should not be misconstrued to mean refugees are pervasive welfare 
dependents, especially when they are well integrated into society. 
While refugee participation in the labor market appears on par with other types of 
immigrants and U.S.-born workers, there may be some income gaps. When compared to 
nonrefugee immigrants, refugees may experience an earnings disparity likely due to 
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differences in education, English language ability, and geographic residence.183 
However, these findings do not account for the refugees’ length of residence in the 
United States, which has a marked effect on refugee economic performance. 
Interestingly, however, an analysis of 3.4 million refugees who arrived in the United 
States between 1975 and 2017 found refugees have a rate of entrepreneurship higher than 
that of other immigrants or native-born people.184  
3. What it Means and Why It Matters 
The economic story of refugees is far more complex and nuanced than the 
extremes claimed by political narratives. A growing body of objective research dispels 
the claim that refugees are fiscal drains on the United States. This research further finds 
that, in general, refugees contribute positively to the local and national economy with the 
length of time to achieve this as the varying factor.  
Luckily, the United States has the ability to help both refugees and the nation’s 
overall fiscal health. Realizing this ability begins with an acknowledgement of the 
research findings, their implications, and appropriate policies to leverage what scholars 
know about refugee economic performance and maximize the potential to benefit all 
parties. The initial fiscal expenditures of resettling refugees should be thought of as 
investments rather than costs. Because integration of refugees is crucial to their quick and 
successful economic performance, these initial investments should reflect this priority.  
B. SECURITY 
Scholars define securitization as “a process of social construction that pushes an 
area of regular politics into an area of security by resorting to a rhetoric of discursive 
emergence, threat and danger aimed at justifying the adoption of extraordinary 
measures.”185 While migration discourse always includes the discussion of real and 
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perceived threats to security, “security” had previously meant social security, rather than 
the terror- and crime-centric way national security is understood today.186 Securitization 
of immigration began in the 1990s and rapidly accelerated and consolidated after the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11.187 
1. The Claim: Refugees Are a Threat to National Security 
The second general claim cited in refugee discourse is that admitting refugees 
from certain countries poses a significant threat to national security due to the risk of 
terrorism and other crimes. The argument is multipronged. It contends not all fleeing 
refugees are innocent victims (i.e., they may just be on the losing side), that terrorist 
groups have promised to infiltrate the United States through the refugee system, and that 
the current screening process is inadequate because the inability to always perform 
thorough security checks means legitimate refugees cannot be distinguished from 
terrorists.188 The argument rightly claims the stakes are high as it only takes one terrorist 
to inflict massive harm, both physically and psychologically. 
Many domestic and foreign tragedies are woven into this narrative. Attacks 
motivated by radical Islam ideology are pulled into refugee discourse without distinction 
as to the national origin of the perpetrators, their immigration status, or the modes of 
admission into the United States. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Muslim 
extremist-linked terrorist attacks carried out domestically and internationally have 
deepened fears of refugees and serve to some as justification for restrictive immigration 
policies.189 President Trump cited the 2015 San Bernardino shooting as a reason for his 
executive order travel ban (one of the perpetrators was American-born, and the other 
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entered the United States with a fiancé visa).190 In the immediate aftermath of the 
November 2015 Paris attacks and the 2016 Brussels bombings, while the events and 
investigations were still unfolding, politicians such as Donald Trump and Ted Cruz 
immediately responded with calls to close U.S. borders and stop the admission of 
refugees from certain countries.191 Immediately following the shooting at the Pulse 
nightclub in Orlando in 2016, Trump reiterated his call for a ban on Muslims from 
entering the United States, despite that the shooter was American-born.192 This 
demonstrates the power that leaders in government have in leveraging unrelated events 
into the narrative of their choosing. One should note the narrative of the risk posed by 
refugees is bipartisan. While the Obama administration increased the overall ceiling of 
refugee admissions, it also stated national security concerns prevented the administration 
from doing more.  
2. The Evidence 
Overall, research shows claims that refugees pose a clear and present threat to 
national security in terms of terrorism and crime is unsubstantiated.193 For instance, 
refugee screening and vetting procedures are often cited as grave weaknesses that could 
be exploited by would-be terrorists.194 However, as noted in Chapter I, refugees in fact 
undergo extensive screening procedures, first by the UNHCR and then by various U.S. 
agencies. Additionally, DOS screens refugees more carefully than any other type of 
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traveler to the United States.195 The arrests of two refugees in Bowling Green, Kentucky, 
in 2009 are anomalies, as they were admitted to the United States despite their 
involvement in the insurgency in Iraq.196 Although the two refugees were not planning an 
attack on United States soil, the case highlighted a vulnerability in the screening process, 
which resulted in several changes to patch the existing system.197 While the lack of 
records and documentation for some refugees’ countries of origin present challenges to 
the security screening process, refugees do undergo extensive scrutiny by U.S. security 
professionals before the admitting agency makes a decision on admission.198 No system 
is perfect, and no system can predict who might later radicalize, which is why risk is an 
important consideration. 
The UNHCR states refugees do not pose a risk to national security in the United 
States.199 While the UNHCR obviously has a great stake in encouraging the proliferation 
and expansion of its refugee resettlement programs, this statement is also supported by 
numerous other sources. For example, since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, no refugees have 
caused a terrorism-related death in the United States.200 An analysis of 161 countries for 
the years 2002–2012 found the number of refugees in a host country has little to no effect 
on the frequency or scale of a terrorist attack in that country.201 Additionally, over the 
last 40 years, just 20 of the 3,250,000 refugees who entered the United States have been 
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convicted of planning or carrying out a terrorist act.202 This amounts to 0.00062 percent 
of all admitted refugees.203 Furthermore, records indicate just three Americans have ever 
died as a result of terror attacks perpetrated by refugees.204 These deaths occurred in the 
1970s and were caused by Cuban refugees.205 These attacks took place prior to the 
Refugee Act of 1980, which established systemic procedures for refugee admissions 
previously lacking.206 While no loss of life is acceptable, these facts put the real risk 
refugees pose into perspective. The risk of fatalities in refugee-caused terrorist attacks in 
the United States is one in 3.6 billion per year.207 For comparison, the annual fatality risk 
in the United States for cancer is one in 540, while Americans have a one in 8,200 chance 
of dying in a traffic accident and a one in 7,000,000 chance of death from lightning.208  
Some critics argue that Americans live in a different world today, changed by the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11. However, the discourse surrounding the national security threat 
posed by refugees brought to the United States existed prior to 9/11. In the mid- to late-
1990s, the global refugee crisis of that time assumed a place on the security agenda of 
governments worldwide.209 Nevertheless, the United States has admitted over two 
million refugees since 1990, and there is very little correlation of that with crime rates.210 
Despite sensationalized accusations that immigrants bring crime to the United 
States and its communities, evidence shows increases in immigrant populations are not 
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associated with increases in crime.211 As immigrant populations rose to historic highs in 
the 1990s, violent and property crime rates actually fell significantly.212 The University 
of Texas found immigrant teens are much less likely to commit crimes and use drugs than 
U.S.-born teens.213 In some cases, communities became safer with an increase in 
refugees.214 For example, as previously mentioned, a study of the Bevo Mill 
neighborhood of St. Louis, Missouri, characterized by a large population of Bosnian 
refugees, experienced lower crime and unemployment rates than that of the greater 
population.215 A broad study by New American Economy, a nonpartisan coalition for 
immigration reform, found that from 2006–2015 nine out of the 10 U.S. cities that 
received the greatest proportion of refugees to their existing population experienced a 
reduction in both violent and property crime, rather than an increase in crime.216 
Similarly, an analysis of data for Austin, Texas found no correlation between recent 
immigration and property crime.217 Scholarly research of Chicago in the 1990s found 
increased immigration “predicted decreases in neighborhood homicide rates.”218 Finally, 
a study of crime and immigrants in New York City confirmed there is no evidence to 
support the claim that greater immigration rates correlate to greater crimes rates; in some 
cases, immigrants appeared to prevent crime.219  
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National analyses of immigration and crime support local findings such as these. 
Using American Community Survey data, the Cato Institute found all immigrants, 
including illegal immigrants, are less likely to be incarcerated than native-born people, 
relative to their proportion of the population.220 The American Immigration Council has 
also found young male immigrants are incarcerated at lower rates than other young 
males.221 Some critics argue the preponderance of evidence refuting the claim that 
immigrants increase crime is flawed because immigrant crime is underreported to 
authorities.222 While this may be possible, it is unknown to what extent it may be 
prevalent. Currently, there is no evidence suggesting any potential underreporting would 
be statistically significant enough to alter the findings that immigration in general is not 
related to greater crime rates.  
3. What It Means and Why It Matters 
Sixteen years have passed since 9/11. Much data has been collected, and findings 
are clear. Restrictive refugee policies based on national security threats are not only 
erroneous but also potentially damaging to United States’ interests at home and abroad. 
In attempting to keep America safe from various threats, “the level of fear being 
expressed is leading to proposals for extreme ‘fixes’ that can do more harm than 
good.”223 
Despite the evidence, the claim that immigrants threaten American public safety 
persists. For example, President Trump’s January 25, 2017 Executive Order, “Enhancing 
Public Safety in the Interior of the United States,” mandated the creation of the 
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement Victims of Immigration Crime Engagement 
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Office.224 This action seeks to legitimatize the narrative that immigrants are a threat to 
public safety, despite preponderance of evidence to the contrary. The 2015 San Francisco 
murder of Kathryn Steinle allegedly by an undocumented immigrant (the case is in trial at 
the time of this writing) provided political fuel for an agenda of immigration restrictions, 
although such cases are few compared to cases involving American citizens, which are 
rarely publicized at this level. The unsupported claims that immigrants threaten public 
safety and that masses of terrorists are entering the country by posing as refugees are 
separate yet overlapping discourse and sentiment. While this analysis focuses on legal 
immigrants, primarily refugees, national discourse and policy only sometimes make these 
important distinctions.  
While general immigration research is more prevalent than research explicitly 
focused on refugees, available evidence appears to have reached consensus for both 
refugees and immigrants in general as it relates to safety and security of Americans. 
Refugees and U.S. policy have suffered as a result of this immigration discourse and 
exaggerated responses to high-profile events. It is true that refugee resettlement is just 
one type of immigration––humanitarian immigration. However, refugees fall into the 
same trap that other immigrant classes do, namely differences among and between the 
groups is not often understood or acknowledged. As a result, refugee policy continues to 
be ad hoc, subject to shifting politics and public opinions. Refugee policy continues to be 
reactionary and subject to emotional appeals rather than sound factual appeals. As it is 
now, refugee policy is based on perpetuating factually inaccurate claims and irrelevant 
events.  
C. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Extensive research shows refugees who resettle in the United States harm neither 
the local nor national economy. Some evidence suggests refugees may actually even 
improve local and national economies. Upon initial arrival, refugees do face hurdles to 
economic integration, which has some costs, but in the long term, they perform on par 
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with other immigrants and native-born people and contribute to the economy. Although 
costs are certainly incurrent in the resettlement of refugees, if the United States invests in 
social and economic integration, evidence suggests refugees have a net neutral or positive 
effect on the economy, as do other immigrants. 
Reports regarding the effect of refugees on United States national security is 
sparse. There may be a relative lack of research because despite the prevalence of claims 
about the homeland security threat posed by refugees, an extremely small number of 
terrorist plotters and serious criminals have entered the United States as refugees. 
Although the narratives about refugees and their threat to the prosperity and security of 
the United States have been confusing and contradictory, the evidence relating to the 
validity of these threats is clear. The United States’ strength and status in the world 
comes from its military, wealth, and adherence to and promotion of moral ideals.225 
Therefore, ignoring the evidence when debating refugee policy is not only 
counterproductive, it is potentially dangerous to United States’ maintenance of status and 
power in the world.  
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IV. CASE STUDIES: CANADA AND GERMANY 
A comparative examination of the effects of refugees on the economy and 
national security of Canada and Germany illustrates similar concerns and impacts as 
those experienced in the United States. Overall, immigration, and therefore, refugees in 
Canada have had little effect on wages and employment in the country. This is true for 
Canada, Germany, and the United States. Also in the United States and Canada, refugees 
have not posed a special or increased risk to national security, nor have they increased 
crime rates. In Germany, however, there appears to be a possible correlation between 
refugees and national security, but it is difficult to evaluate due to numerous complicated 
and intertwining variables as well as a lack of empirical research. Europe faces serious 
issues with radicalization, but do these problems transcend immigration status and 
nationality?  
A. CANADA 
Canada shares the legacy with the United States as a nation built by immigrants. It 
also shares a history of varying periods of restrictive and open immigration.226 Yet there 
are differences as well, especially in regard to official immigration priorities, policies and 
approaches. According to some researchers, Canada has contributed more than its fair 
share of refugee funding and resettlement pledges to the international response to the 
Syrian refugee crisis.227 This is in part because Canada views immigration somewhat 
differently than the United States does.228 Therefore, it presents an interesting 
comparative case study for evaluating whether a relatively greater emphasis and priority  
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for humanitarian immigrants has had negative, positive, or neutral effects on Canada’s 
economy and national security. This chapter begins with a summary of key components 
of Canadian refugee law and policy. A discussion of Canada’s refugee resettlement and 
integration programs further establishes an understanding of the country’s refugee 
framework. Within this context, this chapter provides and discusses the evidence about 
the impact of refugees on Canada’s economy and national security.  
1. History of Refugee Law and Policy 
The history of refugee admissions to Canada includes periods of exclusion as well 
as periods of inclusion. The Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), 
formerly Citizenship and Immigration Canada, cites many examples throughout Canada’s 
history when it provided refuge to persecuted populations such as Quakers fleeing the 
American Revolution in the 1770s, Poles from Eastern Europe from 1830 to 1910, 
European Jews from 1870 to 1914, and Chilean refuges in the 1970s.229 Other sources 
note that in the 1920s, Canada opposed the admission of World War I refugees on the 
grounds that stateless migrants could not be deported after admission.230 Likewise, the 
country continued a restrictive policy toward refugees throughout World War II and in 
the following years.231  
On June 4, 1969, Canada became party to both the UN 1951 Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.232 
Comparatively, the United States became a party to only the 1967 protocol and did so just 
one year prior to Canada.233 The Immigration Act of 1976 established in law the goals of  
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Canada’s immigration policy.234 It also formally designated refugees as a specific group 
of immigrants and codified the UN’s refugee agreements.235 This remained the case until 
9/11. 
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, Canada passed the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) in 2001, superseding the existing 
Immigration Act of 1976.236 As part of the worldwide securitization of immigrants, this 
act expanded government authority for detaining and deporting immigrants suspected as 
security threats.237 However, it also provided Canada clear and modern immigration 
legislation, which it had been lacking for decades.238 IRPA formally stated the primary 
purpose of the refugee program is the humanitarian mission to save and protect lives and 
to uphold Canada’s respect for human rights and freedoms of all humans.239 Statements 
on security follow at the end of the section, perhaps indicative of how Canadians and the 
government view the refugee immigration mission as a moral duty. Comparatively, the 
United States has not significantly modernized its immigration or refugee legislation 
since the Refugee Act of 1980. Today, IRPA is Canada’s guiding immigration 
legislation, much in the way that the INA is for the United States.  
In 2012, Canada introduced significant changes to the refugee admission system 
and amended IRPA.240 First, it created a second class of refugees based on designated 
countries of origin.241 Under IRPA, the minister of the IRCC may designate some 
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countries “safe,” whereby refugees fleeing one of these designated countries is required 
to follow a different claim process that does not include the right to appeal the final 
decision, nor does it provide access to work permits.242 In general, the minister, in 
consultation with provincial governments, proposes refugee resettlement levels annually 
to the Parliament.243 
After making some changes to enhance security authorities and mechanisms in 
the post-9/11 world, Canada has emerged as a world leader in immigration approach and 
policy.244 Contrary to in the United States, in Canada, “immigration and refugee policies 
are planned and considered together.”245 Each year, Canada publishes IRCC 
departmental plans outlining the department’s desired results as well as the plan and 
priorities to meet those goals.246 These plans also contain expenditures, staffing, and 
other metrics to foster transparency.247 The country has overwhelmingly decided that 
immigration is positive for its society and economy.248 In 2013, 20 percent of the 
Canadian population was foreign born (compared to 13 percent of the U.S. 
population).249 Today, immigrants come to Canada as one of three classes: economic 
immigrants (70 percent), family immigrants (18 percent), and humanitarian immigrants, 
or refugees (nine percent).250 
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2. Refugee Resettlement and Integration 
Similar to the United States, Canada’s refugee program has two main 
components. Those individuals requiring protection while residing outside Canada fall 
under the Refugee and Humanitarian Resettlement Program, while those already 
physically present in Canada and seeking protection from external threats and persecution 
fall under the In-Canada Asylum Program.251 For refugees in Canada, the Border 
Services Agency determines eligibility for the claim, and the Immigration and Refugee 
Board, an independent administrative tribunal, holds hearings and makes decisions on 
refugee matters.252 
Refugees located outside Canada receive interviews by Canadian visa officers to 
determine their eligibility and admissibility.253 In addition, refugees seeking resettlement 
in Canada must also undergo and pass a medical examination, criminal screening, and 
security screening.254 A visa officer makes the final decision of acceptance or rejection 
based on the results of the screenings and interview.255 Refugees outside Canada fall into 
one of three categories (in order of greatest number): government-assisted refugees 
(GARs), privately sponsored refugees (PSRs), and Blended Visa Office-referred refugees 
(BVORs) (see Table 1).256  
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Table 1.   Types of Refugees in Canada.257 
 
 
The Canadian government funds a settlement program delivered by provinces, 
territories, service provider organizations, and other partners and stakeholders.258 They 
provide services such as language training, assistance in searching and applying for jobs, 
access to support services such as childcare and transportation, and so on.259 The 
Canadian Orientation Abroad Program, funded by the IRCC, delivers a pre-arrival 
orientation for newcomers to Canada.260 Once refugees are in Canada, the government 
provides essential services and income support funds to GARs for up to one year as part 
of the Resettlement Assistance Program.261 Private entities, such as the Canadian 
Immigrant Integration Program and the Young Men’s Christian Association, provide 
integration resources and assistance directly to refugees, both prior to and after arrival in 
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Canada.262 Financial and integration support, including reception and orientation, 
housing and financial support, and ongoing social support is provided to PSRs by their 
private sponsor(s).263  
The Canadian private sponsorship model has been examined as a model for other 
countries, primarily because the engagement of citizens is believed to boost public 
support for resettling refugees and help those refugees integrate into society more easily 
and successfully.264 In fact, UN High Commissioner Filippo Grandi praised this aspect of 
the Canadian refugee resettlement model.265 Despite this praise, Canada announced it 
would reduce the limit of one type of these PSRs in 2017 to address an existing 
backlog.266 Although highly praised, the PSR program does face some challenges, 
namely slow processing and restrictive rules for sponsored individuals.267 For both 
government and privately sponsored refugees, language is the biggest obstacle to 
integration. Canada’s Rapid Impact Evaluation report found the greatest challenge for 
refugees finding employment was learning one of Canada’s official languages.268 As of 
                                                 
262 “About Us,” Canadian Immigrant Integration Program, accessed November 11, 2017, 
https://www.newcomersuccess.ca/about/.  
263 “Canada’s Resettlement Programs,” Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
Parliamentary Assembly, accessed November 11, 2017, https://www.oscepa.org/documents/all-
documents/winter-meetings/2017-vienna/reports-20/3479-special-report-on-canada-s-resettlement-
programs-eng/file.  
264 Kathleen Harris, “‘Extraordinary Initiative:’ Canada’s Private Refugee Sponsorship System 
Exported as Model for the World,” CBC News, December 14, 2016, 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-refugees-privately-sponsored-global-initiative-1.3895704.  
265 Stephanie Levitz, “Canada’s Refugee Effort Hailed as Model for World by Head of UN Agency,” 
CBC News, March 21, 2016, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/un-refugee-private-government-sponsor-
1.3501400.  
266 Bal Brach, “Canada Limits the Number of Privately Sponsored Syrian Refugee Applicants in 
2017,” CBC News, December 23, 2016, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/canada-limits-
the-number-of-privately-sponsored-syrian-refugee-applicants-in-2017-1.3911172.  
267 “Infographic Refugee Resettlement.”  
268 Immigration Refugees and Citizenship Canada, Rapid Impact Evaluation of the Syrian Refugee 
Initiative (Report No. E1-2016) (Ottawa, Ontario: Immigration Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 2016), 
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/evaluation/pdf/evaluation-syrian-refugee-initiative.pdf.  
 60
September 2016, Canada planned to spend up to $250,000 in funding for research into 
how to improve refugee integration, particularly for those from Syria.269 
3. Economic Impact of Refugees: An Assessment 
Overall, the effects of refugees on Canada’s economy appear to be similar to 
those of refugees in the United States. In general, economists find immigration in Canada 
has a small impact on wages and employment rates.270 As is the case for the United 
States, research regarding economic performance and impact of specifically refugees in 
Canada is limited. At the macroeconomic level, Canada expects current and new refugee 
participation in the labor market will stimulate the Canadian economy, which the 
government views as potentially beneficial for the well-being of all Canadians as wealth 
is spread throughout a nation.271 In British Columbia, including the Vancouver area, 
Syrian refugees are projected to contribute as much as $563 million Canadian dollars in 
cumulative economic activity by the year 2035.272  
In the long term, refugees perform at or near a level economically equivalent to 
native-born workers. It took refugees who settled in the early 1980s approximately 13 to 
15 years to achieve national averages for earnings.273 Other findings conclude refugees 
report average employment earnings at or near the Canadian-born average after 12 or 
more years of residence.274 An analysis of the financial status of refugees residing in 
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Canada’s six largest cities also finds their average financial status is equivalent to the rest 
of the population, but it may take up to 20 years to reach.275 This finding indicates that, 
as is the case in the United States, refugee economic conditions generally improve with 
time to equal or near equal that of native-born workers, though the exact period may 
vary. In some cases, the period may be much shorter than typically expected. For 
example, from 1979 to 1980, approximately 60,000 Vietnamese boat people fled to and 
resettled in Canada.276 A study of 1,300 of these refugees found that within 10 years, 
their unemployment rate was 2.3 percent lower than the Canadian average and that one in 
five had started a business.277  
Local and regional assessments regarding economic impacts of refugees in 
Canada are sparse. There are some indications that immigrants may significantly benefit 
regional and local economies. In Halifax, for instance, where Lebanese refugees settled 
after fleeing the nation’s civil war during the 1960s and 1970s, they are estimated to have 
created about 3.6 local jobs each.278 Furthermore, each university-educated Lebanese 
immigrant in Halifax provides the province with more than $90,000 in net tax revenue 
over his or her lifetime.279  
Refugees start at a lower economic base in Canada than other immigrants, but 
their rate of earnings growth can be higher.280 After 10 years, earnings of refugees are 
comparable to those of other immigrant classes.281 Over time, the annual earnings of 
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refugees reach a level close to economic immigrants to Canada, in the $30,000 range.282 
When compared to nonrefugee immigrants, refugees tend to earn equal or more and have 
greater participation in the labor market, despite having less command of the English or 
French languages.283 In addition, refugees arrive into Canada with more education than 
family class immigrants.284 It is not clear whether this greater education negates the 
disadvantage of poor Canadian language skills or if other factors are at play. When 
compared to both native-born and other immigrant classes, refugee earnings indicate 
successful integration, yet data suggest refugees rely on social assistance (welfare, food 
stamps, etc.) at greater rates than nonrefugee immigrants.285  
The minister of IRCC determines separate target admissions of GARs and PSRs 
on an annual basis.286 Despite the praise for the private sponsorship refugee model, there 
does not appear to be conclusive evidence favoring PSRs over GARs in economic 
performance. Some studies have found PSRs, within six months after resettlement in 
Canada, earn as much as that of those in the skilled worker class.287 Other research has 
found periods when GARs outperformed PSRs in terms of earnings and other periods 
when the inverse was true.288 There may be evidence to suggest that PSRs may integrate 
and contribute to the Canadian economy more quickly than GARs. The Canadian 
government reported approximately half of the adult Syrian PSRs were employed while 
just 10 percent of Syrian GARs were.289 It should be noted that these Syrian refugees 
have recently arrived. GARs receive up to one year of federal income assistance while 
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PSRs general commit to providing financial assistance to the refugees generally up to one 
year.290 The majority of refugee admissions in Canada are GARs rather than PSRs. 
Consistently over time, the incidence of GARs requiring social assistance is greater than 
that of PSRs while the annual income of PSRs has consistently surpassed that of GARs––
suggesting the requirement PSR programs provide integration and assistance to refugees 
greatly enhances and facilitates the refugees’ economic establishment in Canada.291  
Evidence suggests the economic prospects of refugees to Canada are very similar 
to those of refugees in the United States. Refugees in both countries tend to contribute 
more positively to that country’s economy over time. Examples of the positive local 
economic effects of refugees can be seen in both countries. PSRs are unique to 
Canada.292 PSRs are less costly to the government yet contribute to the economy at a 
level equal or superior to government sponsored refugees. PSRs are also often more 
quickly and effectively integrated into society and the labor market than GSRs. The 
United States does not currently have an equivalent program that both limits the 
government costs associated with resettlement while simultaneous maximizing the 
economic contribution potential of those refugees.  
4. Security 
Although the subject of refugees and national security in Canada is somewhat 
under researched, available evidence indicates the admission of refugees to Canada does 
not present a clear and present threat to the country’s national security. Canada’s 
Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration recently examined the nexus of 
9/11 and immigration and found the correlation of refugees with security issues was 
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erroneous.293 This report was completed not long after 9/11 (in 2002), and perhaps not 
unexpectedly, this finding was accepted by some parliamentarians and rejected by 
others.294 In the years since 9/11, however, government analysis has consistently arrived 
at the same conclusion. For example, the Canada Border Services Agency explored the 
potential national security concerns over Syrian nationals in Canada and found that 
Syrian refugees represent a relatively low security threat.295 Canada’s 2016 Public 
Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada does not call out refugees among its list of 
threats.296 Canada views extremist travelers differently. The report also addresses the 
Syrian migration crisis, but it describes the crisis as humanitarian in nature.297 Each 
refugee receives a robust and layered screening before departing for Canada to ensure the 
“safety, security and health of Canadians and the refugees,” and the government works to 
assist in the social, cultural, and economic integration of Syrian refugees to support 
community resilience.298 Experts state Canada’s refugee system has not been infiltrated 
for the planning or execution of a terrorist attack at any time in the previous 30 years.299 
Despite the great amount of opinion pieces in the news media about refugees and 
their relationship to increased crime in Canada, not many scholarly or other research 
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works supports such claims.300 For instance, the Canadian Council of Refugees and the 
UN High Commission for Refugees both state there is no evidence immigration causes 
crime; in fact, immigrants commit fewer crimes and are incarcerated less than native-
born Canadians.301 In fact, research illustrates that an increase in the immigrant 
population correlates with a two to three percent reduction in property crime rates.302 
Effects of this magnitude cannot be attributed to underreporting or a dilution in the 
criminal pool.303 Immigration in Canada appears to reduce violent crime rates there as 
well. Data in 2006 from Statistics Canada found that in Toronto “the percentage of recent 
immigrants was inversely proportional to all types of violent crime.”304 Unfortunately, 
research directly related to refugee effects on Canada’s crime rates, nationally and 
locally, is sparse. However, there is sufficient evidence for immigrants in general and the 
fact that refugees are a subset of this group indicate refugees as a whole have had no 
adverse effect on crime in Canada. 
While evidence for both the United States and Canada finds refugees do not 
increase crime nor do they threaten national security, the two countries deviate in their 
decision making. U.S. refugee policy is driven by discourse this is not necessarily 
factually accurate. While Canada is not immune to competing narratives concerning 
refugees, its own official statistics and analysis support the research findings and is 
reflected in policy and strategy. Critics who ignore this evidence point to the refugee 
impacts on European nations as a warning of what troubles could befall the United States 
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and Canada if their refugee policy is not reformed. This is why an analysis of the impacts 
of refugees in Germany is so valuable.  
B. GERMANY 
Germany is also an important case study because it is a developed country facing 
similar issues regarding immigration and political opposition to immigration. It is also the 
largest recipient of refugees in the past 10 years in Europe. Germany has a much different 
settlement and immigration history than that of the United States and Canada. Its 
prominence on the world stage has varied, and its physical location in Europe makes it an 
interesting case study. Its membership in the EU makes it part of a suprastate, and its 
location on the continent has put it near the frontlines of the historic effects of the Syrian 
refugee crisis in a way the United States and Canada are not. Canada has the United 
States to its south, so a mass displacement of people has not directly affected that 
country. The United States has faced surges of asylum seekers at its southern border, but 
even at its peak, the refugee flow was only a fraction of what it has been in Europe. 
Under the leadership of Angela Merkel, Germany is at the forefront of refugee reception.  
This section begins with a background summary of some key components of 
German refugee law and policy. A discussion of Germany’s refugee resettlement and 
integration programs further establishes an understanding of the country’s refugee 
framework. Within this context, this section provides and discusses the evidence about 
the impact of refugees on Germany’s economy and national for purposes of 
understanding how increased refugee resettlement in the United Sates might affect the 
country.  
1. History of Refugee Law and Policy 
Germany has a unique refugee history. During World War II, it was responsible 
for the forced displacement of the greatest number of people yet to be seen modern 
history, yet it also accepted significant numbers of these refugees following the end of the 
 67
war.305 In subsequent years, from 1945 to 1949, approximately 12 million refugees and 
displaced persons arrived in and across East and West Germany from throughout the 
continent.306 Since the 1990s, Germany has welcomed more than two million refugees 
from Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia.307 Germany is the largest 
destination country for permanent immigration flows among countries of the European 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries.308 Not 
surprisingly, Germany has the second highest foreign-born population in the world, 
second only to the United States.309 However, Germany outranks the United States in 
terms of the immigrant ratio of the overall population. In 2016, 15.6 percent of people 
living in Germany were foreign-born, while in 2015, 13.5 percent of people living in the 
United States were foreign-born.310 
Immigration in Germany is ruled by EU and international law, as well as by the 
domestic constitutional and statutory law.311 The right to claim asylum is enshrined in 
Article 16a of the Constitution of Germany, or German Basic Law, drafted for the post- 
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World War II German government.312 Germany’s experience with the persecution of 
large number of minorities perpetuated by the Nazi Socialists made the inclusion of this 
right important to the country’s post-war government.313 This right was anchored in the 
1951 UN Convention on Refugees.314 Germany became party to the 1951 Convention in 
1953 and party to the 1967 UN Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1969.315 
The prevailing legislative authorities governing refugee admissions and processing in 
Germany are the Asylum Act and the Residence Act.316 The former “codifies the process 
and consequences of granting and denying asylum, whereas the Residence Act provides 
rules concerning the entry, stay, exit, and employment of foreigners in general.”317 
Procedures and rules of asylum are stipulated in the Asylum Act,318 which stipulates 
those granted asylum receive a temporary residence permit as well as social insurance 
benefits and integration services.319 The Residence Act governs “residence, economic 
activity, and integration of foreigners into … Germany.”320  
The Asylum Seekers Benefits Act serves as the framework for asylum seeker 
claims for government assistance, such as payments for living costs and health care 
services.321 This act “forms the legal basis for providing benefits to asylum seekers 
during the asylum procedure and to other foreign nationals whose residence is not 
permanent.”322 Germany’s immigration system applies to people outside of EU 
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countries.323 While citizens and long-term residents of the EU are already permitted to 
reside and work in the country, the formal immigration system applies to individuals 
without EU citizenship.324  
EU law also governs German refugee law and policies. In 2005, the EU 
established the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) for the purpose of ensuring 
minimum standards and protections across all member states.325 Recent migration waves 
to Europe from the Middle East have tested the CEAS. For example, the Dublin 
Regulation states asylum requests by non-EU citizens should be made and processed by 
only one EU country––the EU country of first arrival.326 This places an unfair burden on 
those countries on the exterior of the EU and along migration routes, and the regulation 
has been recognized as a significant problem in the structure of the CEAS.327 Germany 
has suspended its adherence to the Dublin rules to accept and process claims from large 
numbers of Syrian refugees arriving at its borders.328  
2. Refugee Resettlement and Integration 
Similar to the United States and Canada, in Germany, refugees have two major 
options for legal protection. The first and most common path is for a refugee to request 
asylum from German authorities.329 Arrival centers serve as the central entry point for 
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this pathway.330 The authorities determine which German state will be responsible for 
processing the application based on quotas for each state, established by taxes, and 
population figures.331 An initial aid facility houses asylum seekers while this decision is 
made. This facility consists of police, a doctor, cafeteria, dorms, and it provides three 
meals a day, clothing, and hygiene items.332 From there asylum seekers generally go to 
the reception center at a designated Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) 
branch, which is responsible for providing accommodations and the initial stages of the 
asylum procedures.333 There, a refugee is registered and receives food, board, and a 
stipend for personal expenses.334 The regional BAMF office staff adjudicate asylum 
applications after conducting in-person interviews and reviewing documents and 
evidence.335 
In 2012, Germany established a program for the acceptance and resettlement of 
refugees registered and recognized outside of the country by the UNHCR.336 This is the 
second pathway for a refugee to obtain legal protection in Germany. The UNHCR first 
determines whether applicants can return to their home countries, settle in their first 
country of arrival, or should be resettled in another country.337 German officials issue 
refugees they approve for resettlement a residence permit on humanitarian grounds, 
which permits them to work immediately in Germany.338 Approved refugees may also 
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claim social insurance benefits as well as suitable living accommodations with no time 
limit for benefits.339  
In Germany, the integration of refugees and asylees into society is regarded as a 
responsibility of the federal, state, and local governments.340 In 2016, in recognition of 
the importance and challenges of integration, Germany adopted the Meseberg 
Declaration on Integration as well as the Integration Act. 341 The declaration states,  
For successful integration it is indispensable that migrants learn German 
quickly, that they are swiftly integrated into training, tertiary studies and 
the job market, that they understand and respect the foundations on which 
German society is built, and that they respect the laws of the land.342  
To facilitate this, the Integration Act amended several existing laws and provides for 
employment training, integration classes, and better placement and distribution of 
resettled refugee residences.343 
3. Economic  
Germany boasts the largest economy in Europe and the fourth largest in the 
world.344 As a strong leader in the region and the world, Germany has taken aggressive 
action to meet the humanitarian needs created by the Syrian civil war by welcoming 
refugees and providing aid. Though not traditionally viewed as an immigrant-receiving 
country, over the last three decades, Germany has received the greatest share––30 
percent––of all asylum applications in Europe.345  
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Research finds more variation in the effects of refugees on the German economy 
than has been found for the cases of the United States and Canada. Experts from the 
International Monetary Fund expect the large numbers of Syrian refugees in Germany to 
increase aggregate demand and contribute to a moderate increase in gross domestic 
product (GDP).346 This demand is fueled by the fiscal expansion associated with support 
to refugees as well as the expansion in labor supply as resettled refugees begin to enter 
the labor force.347 Public budget expenditures for the admission and integration of 
refugees create short-term cyclical increases in financial markets.348 In this way, public 
spending may act as a demand stimulus.349 However, the demand resulting from a sharp 
rise of refugees to a host country may also lead to inflation.350 Nevertheless, increased 
aggregate demand may stimulate development of local markets in those particularly high-
demand areas, likely those with greater concentrations of refugees than others.351 New 
refugees and other migrants can present “potential new markets and services that can 
revive local economies, and even boost incomes and national GDPs.”352 
Some critics warn new refugees obtaining work permits will flood the labor pool 
and lead to an increase in overall unemployment in host economies.353 In 2015, Germany 
predicted this would be the case for 2016.354 However, the German unemployment rate 
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has been steadily falling, despite the admission of hundreds of thousands of refugees.355 
The country expects the number of unemployed persons to continue to decline in 2017, 
despite the addition of refugees joining the labor market.356 Indeed, as of September 28, 
2017, German think tanks reported the economy remained strong and is on track to see 
the unemployment rate decrease further.357 This trend is likely explained by the existing 
German labor supply shrinking faster than the population due to aging.358 Approximately 
70 percent of asylum seekers are of working age––between 18 and 64 years old––
resulting in a change in the age distribution of EU countries, such as Germany.359 The 
increase in this refugee resettlement, particularly of younger and working age refugees, 
can boost local economies and lead to the creation of new jobs.360  
In the long term, the economic performance of refugees resettled in Germany 
varies. Some forecasts suggest that after refugees have lived in Germany for five to 10 
years, they will yield a net positive fiscal contribution to the country due to their 
contributions to corporate production and the demand stimulated by expenditures.361 
Analysis of data throughout several European countries has found the gaps in 
employment rates between refugees and native-born people decreases by about half 
approximately seven to 10 years after a refugee’s arrival, decreases further 15 to 19 years 
after arrival, and nearly disappears 25 years after arrival.362 However, one 2016 study 
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found that after 20 years of residence in Germany, 59 percent of refugees were employed 
while 67 percent of other immigrants and 68 percent of nonimmigrants were 
employed.363 In the EU, refugees resettled for three years or less are 50 percent less 
likely to be employed than those native-born, a large and significant gap that may be 
attributed to the legal restrictions on labor market participation frequently in place while 
a refugee’s application is being processed.364 One study suggests refugees arriving in 
Germany between 2014 and 2015 have not displaced native-born workers but have 
instead struggled to find jobs.365 Thus, the economic implications of refugees on the 
German economy, from the short- to long-term, are significantly varied.  
Refugees with low qualifications and limited German language skills could 
involve costs and potentially raise unemployment, especially if integration measures 
fail.366 To help ensure this does not occur, Germany’s 2017 annual economic report 
officially recognizes the challenge of labor market integration and cites the Integration 
Act and other significant funding allocated toward these integration efforts.367 In addition 
to the challenges of language skills and qualification, the inability of asylum seekers to 
work while their cases are being adjudicated––a potentially long and lagging process––
also presents a barrier to labor market integration. As discussed, increased immigration 
by refugees can delay the effects of the aging population on the German labor supply, 
although many refugees are not permitted to work within their first 15 months unless no 
suitable EU national worker is available.368 Germany imparts several employment 
restrictions and regulations refugees must adhere to when attempting to integrate into the 
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workforce, and only after four years of residence are all restrictions lifted.369 In the 
interim, as refugee cases are being processed, the German government must bear the 
costs of providing shelter, food supplies, medical care, counseling, and training.370 
However, once a refugee’s request for asylum has been approved, he or she is permitted 
to obtain employment without restrictions.371 
4. Security 
The discussion surrounding the vulnerability of European refugee channels to 
foreign terrorists presents a very real threat. Germany faces significant challenges in 
understanding and addressing the national security threats posed by refugees. While 
Germany and Western Europe have suffered many terrorist attacks in recent years, peer-
reviewed research regarding the threat of refugees to national security in Germany is still 
lacking. As terrorist attacks worldwide have increased since the Syrian civil war began, 
and Europe has experienced an exponential increase in refugees fleeing this conflict area, 
many acknowledge these two trends are not independent of each other.372 However, the 
relationship between refugees and national security threats in Germany is neither well 
researched nor well understood.  
In 2016, Germany suffered seven terrorist attacks, which killed 22 people and 
injured 112.373 That same year, the interior ministry reported that approximately 280,000 
refugees had sought protection in Germany, and 890,000 refugees arrived in 2015.374 
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Significant portions of the media, the public, and government officials throughout the 
world view Germany’s frequency of attacks as a result of its open door policy with 
Syrian refugees.375 For example, on July 24, 2016, two Syrian refugees carried out 
separate attacks, resulting in one dead and 20 wounded.376 However, the problem of 
terrorism and mass attacks on civilians in Germany extends beyond this occurrence. On 
July 18, 2016, a 17-year-old Afghan refugee, who entered Germany as an unaccompanied 
minor in 2015, attacked passengers on a German train, seriously injuring three.377 On 
July 22, 2016, an 18-year-old German-Iranian citizen opened fire on civilians at a 
shopping center in Munich, killing nine people and wounding more than 15.378 On July 
30, 2016, an Iraqi citizen living in Germany for over 15 years (and not a refugee) opened 
fire in a nightclub in Germany, killing one person and injuring four.379 The December 
2016 Christmas market attack is often cited in this discussion although it was actually 
perpetrated by a Tunisian refugee, who entered Europe in 2011––years before the Syrian 
crisis erupted.380  
Although these attacks are unacceptable overall, the interpretation of what these 
attacks mean for refugee policy and national security in Germany varies. The 2017 EU 
Terrorism and Situation and Trend Report stated the influx of refugees to Europe from 
such conflict zones was expected to continue and highlighted that ISIS had exploited this 
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flow to commit acts of terrorism, as evidenced by the 2015 Paris attacks.381 However, 
none of the Paris attackers were Syrian refugees; in fact, all were identified as European 
nationals.382 Despite the attention given to the vulnerability of refugee flows to ISIS 
infiltration, the new refugee modes of entry are not practical for terrorists to exploit. Both 
of the two major routes to the EU pose major obstacles, making it unlikely foreign 
terrorists would use these routes as a reliable means to enter the Schengen area.383 The 
first is costly and dangerous, and the second puts would-be terrorists in Greece, which 
shares no borders with other Schengen countries, making further travel difficult.384 
Moreover, the ISIS advocates primarily for Muslims worldwide traveling to Iraq and 
Syria to fight there or to attack “infidels” in their own communities.385 ISIS leaders have 
emphasized building their state in Iraq and Syria.386 The recruitment of Westerners to the 
Middle East and the power to inspire vulnerable native-born Westerners may pose a 
greater threat to the national security of Germany than the risk of a terrorist entering the 
country by posing as a refugee.387  
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The 2015 Global Terrorism Index identified terrorism as a cause of refugee 
activity and internal displacement rather than a result of refugee movement.388 Although 
concerns about links between terrorism and refugees are valid, fears are often 
exaggerated and the concerns misplaced.389 For instance, these concerns overlook that 
“Europe already has a terrorism problem, and the bigger danger is that radicalized 
European Muslims will transform the Syrian refugee community into a more violent one 
over time.”390 A worldwide analysis found that for the period of 2002–2012 countries 
hosting large numbers of refugees are no more prone to terrorism than countries that do 
not.391 These findings predate the rise of ISIS and the Syrian war, both of which have had 
a significant impact on world affairs and terrorism. In 2016, ISIS was “responsible for 
more attacks and deaths than any other perpetrator group.”392 However, more research is 
needed to understand the national security implications, if any, of refugees in Germany.  
Germany has also struggled with the perception that the great increase in recent 
refugees has led to increased crime throughout the country. This is best exemplified by 
the reports of mass sexual assaults of women by refugees during New Year’s celebrations 
in 2015 and 2016. Alleged mobs of refugees sexually assaulted over 1,000 women, but 
police reported these allegations were unsubstantiated.393 Contrary to these claims, 
German police reported there were no attacks by mobs of refugees and accusations were 
unfounded.394 
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Academic research regarding the impact of refugees on crime in Germany is 
sparse; however, the government of Germany tracks and reports some statistics related to 
immigrant crime. Germany’s Federal Criminal Police Agency (BKA) reported that from 
2014 to 2015, refugee crime in Germany increased 79 percent, but the crime rate is 
insignificant in proportion to the number of refugees.395 The BKA also found the majority 
of individuals seeking asylum do not commit criminal offenses.396 One short-term study 
found refugees arriving in Germany during the same time were related to marginal 
increases in criminal activity (related to drug offenses and fare-dodging), but there is little 
evidence suggesting large increases in crime occur directly following refugee flows.397 
The BKA further found in 2015 that refugees committed crimes at the same levels as 
native-born Germans.398 At other times, the German government has found native-born 
Germans were more likely to commit crimes than migrants (consistent with similar 
findings in the United States and Canada).399 In 2016, the German Interior Ministry 
reported suspected crimes by migrants increased by approximately 53 percent, though 
this figure includes refugees, asylum seekers, and illegal immigrants.400 Based on such 
limited research and sources, and the challenge of accounting for such factors as length of 
residence, education, and income, it is difficult to confidently render a summary 
consensus on the crime threat and rates of refugees in Germany. Although the United 
States and Canada resettled approximately 79,000 and 22,000 refugees in 2016, 
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respectively, Germany received approximately 280,000 asylum seekers that same year.401 
Considering its land mass is smaller than both that of the United States and Canada, 
coupled with the hundreds of thousands of new arrivals from Syria, this understandably 
presents challenges not faced by the United States and Canada. While research in the 
United States and Canada clearly find no evidence refugees increase crime or threaten 
national security, research in Germany may be a bit more conflicting, but certainly it does 
not indicate narratives claiming refugees increase crime and terrorism in Germany are 
valid. In all three countries, discourse incorrectly tends to use refugees, immigrants, and 
even native-born people of non-European decent interchangeably when evaluating 
terrorism incidents and lessons learned.  
C. CHAPTER CONCLUSION  
Canada and the United States share a storied past of immigration. Both the states 
consist of periods where exclusionary attitudes shaped immigration policy as well as 
more welcoming periods. Unlike the United States, however, Canada established clear 
immigration priorities and goals. While Canada also experienced some of the populist 
backlash that has prevailed in the United States, the government has taken a different and 
more open approach toward Syrian refugees. In general, research demonstrates 
immigration in Canada has little effect on wages and employment in the country. Over 
time, refugees tend to experience economic success similar to that of native-born 
workers. This is also true in both the United States and Germany. Many scholars believed 
the large numbers of Syrian refugees entering Germany would increase unemployment, 
but overall unemployment in the country has actually declined, and the declining trend is 
expected to continue. Germany’s aging population has created a need for more immigrant 
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and Canada are aging at a significantly slower pace; therefore, the economic effects of 
hundreds of thousands of refugees entering Germany may not be replicable in the United 
States.402  
Since the 1990s, Germany has been a targeted destination for many immigrants to 
and within Europe. Refugees in Germany have traditionally and overwhelmingly gained 
entry into the country through the asylum process, as opposed to the UNHCR 
resettlement program. This fact, along with the general higher frequency of terror attacks 
in Europe than in North America, has perhaps served as a fuel for concerns regarding 
refugees and national security in Germany. The issue of refugees and terrorism is often 
confused in Germany, as it is in the United States and Canada. In Germany, it cannot be 
said there is no risk or no correlation between immigrants, including refugees, and 
national security. However, the problem of terrorism faced by Germany and all of Europe 
appears to transcend immigration status and nationality, suggesting larger issues are at 
play. In both the United States and Canada, refugees and immigrants in general have 
posed no special or increased risk to national security, nor have they increased crime 
rates as illustrated by various reports.  
The issue of how to effectively and successfully integrate refugees into both the 
labor market and society in general is paramount to all three countries. Evidence suggests 
that with proper integration, refugees contribute positively to their host country’s 
economy more quickly. The added benefit of this labor market integration is the 
corresponding integration into greater society that comes along with it, in part through 
employment and its ability to prevent the opportunity for later radicalization.  
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Claims that refugees negatively impact a country’s economy and national security 
in the United States, Canada, and Germany are unfounded. Fears of economic and 
security collapses resulting from the massive influx of Syrian refugees to Germany, for 
example, have proven to be without merit. Contrary to national discourse and the Trump 
administration’s rhetoric, national security experts acknowledge, “Refugees have 
historically played … a critical role in ensuring U.S. economic prosperity and cultural 
diversity.”403 However, there remain significant challenges and outcomes that must be 
addressed in a country’s refugee policy. First, policy makers must recognize and accept 
the narrative that refugees harm the U.S. economy and national security is baseless and 
promote these facts to the larger society. Other challenges of fiscal prudency and 
homeland security appear to have a common solution––effective integration. The 
successful integration of refugees into a host country’s labor market and society 
accelerates those positive effects of their migration as well as minimizes the risk and 
vulnerability of ostracized refugees falling prey to crime and extremist ideology.  
This matters for several reasons. America and its allies generally accept that “the 
United States leads the world in three distinct areas: military strength, wealth, and 
adherence to and promotion of moral ideals.”404 Its strength and wealth have been 
demonstrated through its military strikes in Syria and by giving $4.5 billion in 
humanitarian aid to the UNHCR since the start of the Syrian crisis. 405 However, the U.S. 
response to the Syrian crisis has failed to adhere to its role as a promoter of moral 
ideals.406 American identity based on an immigrant heritage, the promise of a land of 
opportunity, and refuge for those fleeing dangerous and oppressive situations in their 
home countries are some of these ideals. Increasing the securitization of immigrants since 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks has made it difficult for the United States to adhere to its moral 
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ideals. The relatively moderate action of the United States in accepting Syrian refugees 
under the Obama administration, yet its outward hostility and skepticism of refugees 
under the Trump administration thus far has threatened the United States’ position in the 
international community by undermining its moral authority and leadership.  
This struggle is just one piece of the greater immigration debate in the United 
States. This debate has competing narratives that stall reform and offer little room for 
negotiation or concessions. The U.S. reaction to the Syrian refugee crisis is 
comparatively weak when compared to the responses of Canada and Germany. Although, 
the United States and Canada share a tradition of immigration, the two countries have 
responded differently to the Syrian refugee crisis.407 Canada’s strongly positive position 
toward refugees is a large reason for the increase in Canada’s stature in the international 
community over recent years.408 Though not without criticism, Germany has also 
strengthened its status on the European continent and indeed throughout the world by 
taking in the largest number of refugees in Europe. Meanwhile, the United States has 
abandoned its adherence to its moral ideals, and in doing so, may have jeopardized its 
wealth, security, and power. Soft power is particularly important in international 
relations, and many lawmakers and citizens fear recent restrictive U.S. refugee policy 
will erode this important power.409 
A. ECONOMIC FINDINGS  
This thesis shows that several general economic findings are consistent across all 
three countries. In the short term, accepting and resettling refugees require state 
expenditures. However, these expenditures can sometimes act as a stimulus to the 
economy as a whole as a result of working refugees contributing to corporate production 
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and their contributions to higher aggregate demand.410 Initially, new refugees earn less in 
wages and are employed less than other immigrant groups or native-born workers, 
although individual economic performance tends to increase the longer a refugee resides 
in their new country. Moreover, the impacts of refugees on the greater economy also 
trend net positive after a decade or two. Although the economic effects of refugees come 
as both benefits and challenges for the host country, the ability to capitalize on the 
advantages depends on how seamlessly refugees are integrated into the country’s social 
and economic fabric.411 Integration efforts, specifically those aimed at labor market 
integration, appear to be the single most significant and varying factor influencing the 
success and benefits of refugees to an economy in a developed and liberal democracy.  
The first challenge to economic integration is related to the time it takes to 
process refugees. In all three countries featured in this thesis, refugees and asylum 
seekers cannot fully and legally enter the workforce until their claims have been 
approved. The time that may elapse during this process varies, and this time spent in 
status limbo hinders labor market integration and prolongs state assistance. Even with 
temporary status, companies may be hesitant to invest in refugees if they believe as 
employees they may be deported.412 Therefore, it is imperative that refugee and asylum 
claims are processed quickly, so applicants can either be deported or, if granted 
protection in the United States, quickly enter the labor market.413 Other unforeseen and 
unintended consequences of a lengthy or backlogged adjudication process are possible. 
Lengthy processes for refugees in Bulgaria in the 1990s, for example, created barriers to 
entering into the labor economy, which prompted many to enter black market and shadow 
economies.414  
The second challenge and perhaps most frequently cited issue associated with 
barriers to refugee economic integration is limited language skills. Language proficiency 
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is a critical skill needed for refugees to obtain and maintain work.415 Additionally, 
language is the key with which greater social and economic opportunities can be 
unlocked.416 In some ways, the United States and Canada may have an advantage over 
Germany because English is a common language in business and education around the 
world.417 Still, comprehension and command of the host country language is rare among 
newly arrived refugees.  
Even with appropriate language skills, refugees often lack possession of their 
professional credentials and certifications as a result of the dangerous situations that 
forced them to leave their homes. This lack of documentation may present further barriers 
to their attainment of professional work in their fields of expertise. A comprehensive 
strategic plan should find creative solutions to this problem. Additionally, creative ways 
to perpetuate refugees’ own personal incentives to acclimate and integrate may further 
boost economic participation and contributions. The Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development has stated, “Policies aimed at fostering labor market 
integration and optimizing migrants’ economic contribution need to recognize that these 
individuals will only undertake costly investments in host country-specific human capital 
if they are likely to pay off over the life cycle.”418 If refugees do not perceive a likelihood 
of future permanent settlement in the host country, there is little incentive to invest in 
gaining new skills and meeting their economic potential.419 
Governments should not minimize the importance of integration services and 
efforts. For Germany, failing to integrate large numbers of their refugee population could 
result in sustained net costs to the public sector, or at best, provide the economy 
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unneeded low-skill labor.420 These efforts also need to take place quickly to minimize 
costs and maximize both individual and overall economic benefits.421 Additionally, better 
integration through resettling refugees in geographic areas and localities in need of their 
particular skills could help foster effective and long-lasting labor market integration. 
Indeed, economic efficiency dictates resettlement should take place where hosting costs 
are low and opportunity for labor market integration is high.422 Refugees and their host 
countries can realize their full potential if refugees are free to go where their skills are in 
demand.423 
B. SECURITY FINDINGS 
There is little empirical research regarding the effects of refugees on host 
countries’ public safety. In general, more data and analysis examining immigrant crime 
statistics were available than for threats to national security through terrorist attacks. This 
was true for all three countries. Individual and macro-level studies show immigration 
does not increase crime.424 While most evidence clearly dispels the claim that refugees 
increase crime in their host countries and that they pose a threat to national security, 
studies in Germany have found contradictory evidence. In some years, immigrants and 
refugees have committed nonviolent crimes at a slightly greater rate than native-born 
Germans, while in other years native-born Germans committed more crimes than 
immigrants. This fluctuation is hardly a cause for concern, as the United States has a 
much higher crime rate than Germany.425  
Recent discourse focuses on the terrorism threat posed by refugees. In 2015, 
terrorism expert Seth Jones testified before the United States House of Representatives 
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Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence 
that “in most instances, a would-be terrorist’s refugee status had little or nothing to do 
with their radicalization and shift to terrorism.”426 Yet the misconception that refugees 
pose a threat to national security persists in the United States. Brookings Institution 
Senior Fellow Daniel L. Byman warns the Trump administration’s restrictive refugee 
policies and actions toward travel restrictions may result in an increase in terrorism 
against Americans as Muslims both home and abroad feel marginalized and 
victimized.427 For those immigrants and refugees who are new arrivals to the United 
States, integration efforts are vital to the safety and security of the country.  
Both Canada and Germany view the nexus between refugees and terrorism 
differently than the United States. From the months after 9/11 through the decade and a 
half since, the Canadian government has consistently found the juxtaposition of refugees 
with security issues is erroneous and that Syrian refugees pose a low security threat.428 
Canada’s break with the United States in its refugee policy, specifically for Syrians, has 
poised itself to carry the mantle of world leadership as the United States enters a period 
of protectionism and nationalism.429 When it comes to immigrants and security, the 
German government tends to view nationalism and xenophobia rather than the 
immigrants and refugees themselves as threats to national security.430 This view is made 
that much more stark when considering Europe faces a larger terrorism problem than the 
United States.431 Where current U.S. leadership fails to understand important differences, 
Canada and Germany both understand terrorism is not synonymous with immigrants, nor 
vice versa.  
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A STRATEGIC PLAN FOR 
IMMIGRATION 
The examples and experiences of how Canada and Germany approach refugee 
policy provide meaningful lessons and evidence that the United States can use as 
guidance for its policy. These recommendations are as follows: 
1. Like Canada, establish national immigration priorities and goals. Codify 
these priorities if possible. 
2. Like Canada, consider refugees and immigration together as a whole, not 
separate issues. 
3. Like Canada, consider use of privately sponsored refugee programs, 
especially for integration purposes. 
4. Like Canada, provide an annual immigration report on plans and priorities 
that includes strategic outcomes, planned expenditures, priorities, staffing, 
and the like.432 
5. Like Canada, shift to a multi-year approach for commitments to refugee 
populations to allow better planning and continuity with partners.433  
6. Do what the Refugee Act of 1980 attempted but failed to do: reign in the 
unilateral power of the executive to set refugee priorities while providing 
for the ability to operate uninterrupted into the future and ensuring the 
United States maintains the freedom to quickly respond and adjust to new 
refugee needs worldwide.  
7. Extend available aid for new refugees from 90 days to 365 days, the 
duration for which Canada provides aid.  
8. Measure integration as a performance measure in program outcomes.434  
9. Like Germany, require refugees to complete integrations services, 
including English language classes.  
10. Resettling many more refugees as part of a counterterrorism approach. 
Reducing the time and number of refugees waiting in refugee camps could 
reduce terrorism worldwide and keep us safer by limiting the time and 
opportunity for desperate and vulnerable people to be radicalized.  
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11. Streamline refugee process to reduce wait times and allow for refugee 
camps to accommodate more people in need.435 This also helps reduce 
opportunity for radicalization in camps.  
Refugee policy should be a part of any homeland security strategy but not because 
refugees threaten U.S. prosperity or national security; rather, because we live in a 
globalizing world wherein forced displacements due to conflicts across the world affect 
the United States both directly and indirectly. It is in our interest to ensure global stability 
to the greatest extent possible. By ignoring the evidence concerning refugee impacts on 
the economy and national security, U.S. leadership threatens its own homeland security 
and undermines U.S. credibility in the international community, and its power and 
influence that comes along with that credibility. For too long, U.S. policy makers have set 
refugee policy on an ad hoc basis, to the detriment of the United States and refugees 
alike. Implementation of a strategic plan for immigration faces the same challenges as 
immigration reform, yet the evidence and experiences of Canada and Germany offer 
several important and meaningful ways to improve U.S. refugee policy, as outlined in 
these recommendations.  
 
 
                                                 
435 Zong and Batalova, “Refugees and Asylees in the United States.”  
 91
APPENDIX.  THE UNITED STATES REFUGEE PROCESSING 
AND SCREENING SYSTEM 
This appendix contains a U.S. Department of State infograph, broken into pieces, 
which sums up the refugee screening and processing system in the United States.436  
 
                                                 
436 Source: U.S. Department of State, “The Refugee Processing and Screening System (JPEG Version 
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